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In the wake of Watergate, Congress enacted a slew of legislative
reforms aimed at plugging the myriad holes in transparency and oversight
the scandal laid bare. These included the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
important amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, the Inspector
General Act, the Ethics in Government Act, the Federal Election Commission
Act and creation of the Federal Election Commission, the National
Emergencies Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the
Impoundment Control Act. Unlike President Richard Nixon, who resigned on
the threat of impeachment, President Donald J. Trump was twice impeached
for alleged abuses in office—and he was twice acquitted in the Senate.
Arguably, the articles of impeachment did not fully capture his abuses of
office, including those that culminated in the 482-page report of Special
Counsel Robert Mueller regarding the 2016 Trump campaign’s cooperation
with Russian intelligence to influence the election on Trump’s behalf. But that
was just the beginning. Over the course of four years in office, Trump and his
enablers in Congress managed to exploit gaps or lapses in the postWatergate reform legislation while flouting numerous provisions of the
Constitution that were not even the focus of Congress post-Watergate—
including the Emoluments Clauses, the Advice and Consent Clause, and
aspects of the Impeachment Clauses. The Trump years also underscored
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inadequacies in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and the relatively ancient
legislative process for tallying Electoral College votes. With Democrats now
controlling both Houses of Congress, as well as the White House under
President Joe Biden, it is imperative that the legislature step in once again to
fill the separation of powers vacuum in the breach. To be sure, the Framers
understood that power corrupts. Despite their expectation that only
individuals of moral character and fidelity to the rule of law would ascend to
the presidency, the structure of the Constitution itself underscores the
foundational aim of accountability; thus, their most powerful creation—the
Legislative Branch—must not sit idly by. Although this article does not
(indeed, cannot) purport to lay out in any detail the model features of
statutory reform measures, it does fill a significant gap in the legal literature:
a review of the post-Watergate reform legislation and an assessment of how
it fared through the Trump administration. The article also sketches out
legislative priorities and needs as a preliminary benchmark for future
research, analysis, and policy reform.
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INTRODUCTION
In the Twentieth Century, when people thought of presidential
scandal, the first administration that often came to mind was that of President
Richard Nixon. After two impeachments and numerous criminal and civil
investigations, President Donald J. Trump’s administration became the
modern model of presidential scandal. Nixon famously resigned his office
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rather than face likely impeachment over the Watergate scandal.1 In response
to the corruption laid bare by the Nixon administration, Congress embarked
on a legislative mission that culminated in a series of statutory reforms to
make the federal government more transparent and accountable, and thus
deter future misconduct.2 Congress must do the same—with even more
vigor—in the wake of the Trump administration.
This article examines the post-Watergate reforms and the extent to
which they have been effective, with a specific focus on the ways they were
tested by the Trump administration. In doing so, it identifies weaknesses
within current oversight laws and prescribes paths to reinforce the important
protections they were designed to impose, albeit failingly. Part I provides a
historical overview of the Nixon administration’s clashes with democratic
institutions to contextualize the post-Watergate oversight reforms.3 Part I also
examines the abuses that were only discovered later, after the Watergate
investigation.4
Part II details the key provisions of the post-Watergate statutes,
adding information and context for how these pieces of legislation have
evolved since their passage.5 Part II’s first topic is agency transparency and
oversight reforms.6 Implementation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA) and subsequent modifications are discussed within the context of the
presidential administrations that created a demand for the legislative action.7
It then addresses the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), which sought to expedite the information disclosure process and
limit exclusions to public oversight,8 as well as the rise of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which was an attempt to limit
surveillance on American citizens.9 Part II then addresses the statutory
measures established to limit executive powers after Watergate.10 The article
explores the objectives of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), the
Impoundment Control Act, and the National Emergencies Act, along with the
1
See Rick Perlstein, Watergate Scandal, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (June 10, 2021), https://www.
britannica.com/event/Watergate-Scandal [perma.cc/7RY7-3PEQ] (describing Nixon’s
resignation and the events motivating that decision).
2
See SAM BERGER & ALEX TAUSANOVITCH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, LESSONS FROM
WATERGATE: PREPARING FOR POST-TRUMP REFORMS 3–10 (2018) (chronicling the postWatergate legislative reforms and explaining how these reforms aimed to create a more
ethical and transparent government).
3
See infra Part I.
4
See infra Part I.C.
5
See infra Part II.
6
See infra Part II.A.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
See infra Part II.B.
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shortcomings of these three statutes as evidenced under the Trump
administration.11 Part II concludes with consideration of the watchdog
mechanisms added in the aftermath of Watergate,12 including the Inspector
General Act and the Ethics in Government Act, as well as abuses by
presidents notwithstanding these reforms, congressional failures to renew
valuable legislation, and recent attempts to revive statutes that lapsed.13
Part III discusses Trump-era events that tested the post-Watergate
reforms.14 The discussion covers the Ukraine “quid pro quo” scandal that led
to his first impeachment, Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation,15
the Trump campaign’s alleged FISA abuses,16 and the widespread and
unprecedented removals and intimidation of Inspectors General.17 Part III
also addresses whether the White House COVID-19 response task force led
by Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner was subject to the mandatory
disclosure requirements under FACA.18 Next, the article scrutinizes President
Trump’s failure to appoint enough members to the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) to enable enforcement of campaign finance and election
laws, as well as his own possible violations of federal election law.19 Finally,
the article describes President Trump’s use of the National Emergencies Act
to push his promise to build a wall at the Southern border in contravention of
Congress,20 as well as the increased delays to the already sizeable FOIA
backlog under the Trump administration.21
The article concludes with recommendations for how the postWatergate reforms should be reinforced and supplemented with further
oversight legislation.22
I. WATERGATE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The Nixon presidency shed light on deficiencies in American
democratic institutions, and in doing so revealed an urgent need for increased

11

Id.
See infra Part II.C.
13
Id.
14
See infra Part III.
15
See infra Part III.A–B.
16
See infra Part III.C.
17
See infra Part III.D.
18
See infra Part III.E.i.
19
See infra Part III.F.i.
20
See infra Part III.G.
21
See infra Part III.H.
22
See infra Conclusion.
12
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congressional oversight of the Executive branch.23 Perhaps the most famous
instance of the Nixon administration’s corruption occurred on October 20,
1973, through events that came to be known as the “Saturday Night
Massacre.”24 That evening, Nixon ordered Attorney General Elliot
Richardson to fire Archibald Cox, the Special Counsel appointed to
investigate the suspicious break-in at the Watergate hotel.25 Nixon directed
Richardson to fire Cox to stifle his investigation involving taped private
conversations between Nixon and the former Attorney General John
Mitchell.26 Richardson refused to fire Cox and resigned in protest — as did
his deputy. Ultimately, Solicitor General Robert Bork agreed to fire Cox, but
the departure of three high-level officials from the Department of Justice
undermined Nixon’s goal of ending the investigation.27 Congress later came
to the conclusion that a more independent investigative mechanism was
needed to look into future Executive misconduct.28
The Supreme Court’s ruling on July 24th, 1974, sealed the fate of
Nixon’s presidency. The Court concluded that Nixon could not “withhold
evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial.”29 Nixon faced a
criminal subpoena for his Oval Office recordings, and fought to keep the
tapes secret.30 A unanimous Court in United States v. Nixon rejected his claim
of an “absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial
process under all circumstances,” and found that the public interest in
disclosure outweighed the president’s generalized interest in secrecy.31 In
response to the ruling, Nixon initially contended he did not have to obey the

23

See Earl Warren, Governmental Secrecy: Corruption’s Ally, 60 A.B.A. J. 550, 550–52
(1974) (“If anything is to be learned from our present difficulties, compendiously known as
Watergate, it is that we must open our public affairs to public scrutiny on every level of
government.”).
24
Carl Levin & Elise J. Bean, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter of Public
Confidence and Constitutional Balance, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 12 (1987) (citation omitted).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Benjamin J. Priester, Paul G. Rozelle & Mirah A. Horowitz, The Independent Counsel
Statute: A Legal History, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 10 (1999). Ultimately, the Ethics in
Government Act, discussed in detail in Part II, infra, was passed and established a
mechanism for the Department of Justice to appoint independent counsels who had greater
removal protections.
29
See James M. Naughton, Nixon Slide From Power: Backers Gave Final Push, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 1974, at 51, https://www.nytimes.com/1974/08/12/archives/nixon-slide-frompower-backers-gave-final-push-former-defenders.html [perma.cc/N6BK-M597] (quoting
the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)).
30
Id.
31
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974).
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Court’s order, stating it was within his constitutional right to flout it.32 But
after his legal counsel, James St. Clair, advised him that doing so was a sure
ticket to impeachment and conviction, Nixon issued a statement agreeing to
comply.33 And so began a fifteen-day series of events that would lead to
Nixon’s resignation.34
The fact that Nixon resigned before impeachment proceedings began
may lead one to believe he did so because he knew what he did was wrong,
which may actually be the case. The contents of Nixon’s conscience were
known only to him. What certainly did play a significant role in his decision
to resign was the lack of support from Congress, including members of his
Republican party. Both the House and the Senate had a Democratic majority,
and even though impeachment was highly likely, Nixon initially felt that he
would secure the thirty-four Senate votes needed to avoid conviction and
removal.35 Nixon miscalculated the great magnitude of his June 23rd tapes.
The recordings revealed that he tried to enlist CIA members to convince the
FBI to collaborate with him and distort the evidence against him in the
Watergate scandal.36 Knowing that Nixon was not going to resign just
because someone advised him to, St. Clair and other White House aides took
it upon themselves to inform Nixon’s closest allies about the contents of the
tapes so that Nixon would have no choice but to realize that if impeachment
proceedings went forward, not even those closest to him would be able to
prevent his conviction and removal.37
Whereas the House Judiciary Committee was dealing with
circumstantial evidence and the testimony of John W. Dean, ousted White
House counsel, in order to build a case against Nixon and his involvement in
the Watergate break-in, the June 23rd recording transcript was the “smoking
gun” that not even Nixon’s staunchest supporters could overlook.38 Apart
from St. Clair, Nixon’s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, advised Nixon
that other countries would perceive the U.S. as a weak state if the
impeachment trial went forward.39 Amid the ongoing Cold War, the President
needed to appear authoritative to ensure other countries would trust his word
during times of diplomatic or military crisis.40 St. Clair called a meeting of

32

Naughton, supra note 29 at 51.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Naughton, supra note 29 at 2, 12.
33
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eight Republican Senate members and informed them of the contents of the
tapes that were not yet released to the public.41 The members, who risked
their credibility in preventing Nixon from being impeached, were enraged;
they had wrongly believed there was no direct evidence linking Nixon to the
scandal.42
Shortly thereafter, the same members called for a private meeting
with Nixon. They were advised by his Chief of Staff, Alexander Haig Jr., that
when conducting this meeting, they should not be direct in telling Nixon to
resign. Haig believed that Nixon was close to resigning, but if told to do it,
he would do the complete opposite.43 When they finally met with Nixon, the
congressional caucus informed him that he lacked even half of the thirty-four
votes he needed to avoid conviction and proceeded to list one by one the
names of both Democrats and Republicans that would vote against him.44
Nixon listened, and although his departure was inevitable because of the
evidence stacked against him, some members of Congress mourned his
departure. On the day of Nixon’s resignation, forty members were invited to
the White House so that Nixon could thank them for their loyalty and support
and nearly all of them, including Nixon, wept.45
The Saturday Night Massacre is perhaps the clearest example of how
an exceedingly expansive view of Executive power could threaten American
democracy, especially if there is no “smoking gun” proof like the June 23
transcripts that not even the staunchest supporter of the president could
contest. Other examples of his threats to the rule of law nonetheless abound.
Nixon challenged Congress’s sweeping authority over government
spending through a coordinated effort to impound funds appropriated for
federal agencies, including funding for water pollution funds.46 Each year
41

Id. at 51.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Irwin R. Kramer, The Impoundment Control Act of 1974: An Unconstitutional Solution to
a Constitutional Problem, 58 UMKC L. REV. 157, 162–63 (1990); see Executive
Impoundment of Appropriated Funds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 3 (1971) (statement of Sen. Sam J.
Ervin) (“[B]y impounding appropriated funds, the President is able to modify, reshape, or
nullify completely laws passed by the legislative branch, thereby making legislative policy
through executive power. Such an illegal exercise of the power of his office flies directly in
the face of clear constitutional provisions to the contrary.”); see also Kevin Kosar, So…this
is Nixon’s fault?, POLITICO (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/10/
richard-nixon-congressional-budget-control-act-history-000282/ [perma.cc/VTW8-SE99]
(“The president had been antagonizing Congress by blaming it for budget deficits and
inflation. John Ehrlichman, a top Nixon adviser, loudly denounced the ‘credit-card
Congress,’ and likened it to a derelict relative who impoverished a family by running up
42
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between 1971 and 1974, the Nixon administration impounded seventeen to
twenty percent of all funds appropriated by Congress.47 This was done to
draw concessions on spending cuts48 and was a direct challenge to Congress’s
spending power.49 The effort raised fears in Congress that the President,
through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), “holds unprecedented
control over the resources of the federal government.”50
Although the Constitution does not exclusively mention
impoundment as a power vested with the Executive, the President has vast
administrative powers in the realm of national security as commander-inchief.51 In cases like Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court
held the legislature’s power of the purse allows it to set an expenditure ceiling
that confines the executive.52 Within those limits, the executive has power to
control the expenditure of appropriated funds as the administrator of
government.53 As a result, presidential impoundments had never been
contested in federal court in the context of national security.54 Nixon tried to
stretch this power and utilize it in the domestic realm.55
The Supreme Court stepped in to check Nixon in Train v. City of New
York,56 the only modern impoundment case to reach the Court. In that case,
the Court heard a challenge to Nixon’s refusal to spend money appropriated

bills. Nixon upped the pressure by telling Congress to spend no more than $250 billion, and
by threatening to veto appropriations bills that exceeded this cap.”). “Impoundment” refers
to the deliberate decision by a President to refuse to allow appropriated funds to be spent. Id.
47
Nile Stanton, History and Practice of Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds, 53
NEB. L. REV. 1, 2 (1974). This constituted more funding than any other president in history.
48
See Kramer, supra note 46, at 162 (describing how Nixon used impoundments as a tool to
“eliminate or severely curtail programs that he opposed”).
49
See Philip Joyce, The Congressional Budget Office at Middle Age 2–3 (Hutchins Ctr. on
Fiscal & Monetary Pol’y at Brookings, Working Paper No. 9, 2015), https://www.brook
ings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PJ_WorkingPaper9_Feb11_Final.pdf [perma.cc/5X
SK-TLDT] (sharing an account of the presidential impoundment strategy that reached its
zenith during the Nixon administration as a “seven-year budget war” between the executive
and legislative branches).
50
See 119 CONG. REC. 19,435 (1973) (statement of Sen. James A. McClure) (entering
Holmes Alexander’s essay, The Heavy Burden of the Federal Purse, into the record to
document the public’s reaction to Sen. William Scott's proposal to transfer control of the
Office of Management and Budget to Congress).
51
Roy E. Brownell II, The Constitutional Status of the President’s Impoundment of National
Security Funds, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 24 (2001).
52
Id. at 24–25 (citing Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937)).
53
Brownell, supra note 51, at 24–25.
54
Id. at 20.
55
Id. at 46.
56
420 U.S. 35, 45–46 (1975).
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under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.57 New York City sued,
arguing that the language of the Act mandated that all money appropriated
by Congress be spent.58 Nixon responded that the Constitution granted the
Executive unlimited discretion to spend funds.59 The Court rejected Nixon’s
argument and held that the President cannot impound funds that Congress
intended would be spent.60 Yet there remained significant concern that a
future President might again attempt to usurp Congress’s power over the
budget.
The concern was not unfounded. By 1973, Congress had enacted 470
statutes that gave the President “extraordinary powers, ordinarily exercised
by the Congress.”61 Because there is no general emergency powers provision
in Article II of the Constitution, even the legislature must look at the statutes
it has enacted to determine what exact powers it has delegated to the
President.62 Among those powers was the ability to “seize property; organize
and control the means of production; seize commodities; assign military
forces abroad; institute martial law; seize and control all transportation and
communication; regulate the operation of private enterprise; [and] restrict
travel . . . .”63 But as the Special Senate Committee on the Termination of the
National Emergency Act indicated during the Nixon administration, no one

57

Id. at 40–41. A particularly contentious instance of impoundment was Nixon’s refusal to
spend money appropriated for water pollution control funds. See Stanton, supra note 46, at
n. 3 (describing the Senate’s reaction to Nixon’s impoundment of the water pollution control
funds). The President claimed that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, in mandating that all money appropriated by Congress under the Amendments for
water pollution control be spent, had infringed on the Executive’s Article II authority. Id. at
3. At the time, Senator Edward Muskie argued that Congress could not have been clearer
regarding the way the money was to be spent, because the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act amendments which appropriated them were passed overwhelmingly by both the House
and Senate. Id.at 1–2 n.3 When the President initially vetoed the amendments, the veto was
overridden immediately by both houses. Id. In light of that reality, Muskie argued, the
President’s impoundment of the water pollution control funds was particularly egregious. Id.
58
Train, 420 U.S. at 40.
59
See Stanton, supra note 47, at 3 (describing how Nixon argued that the mandate that
required spending the full amount “conflicts with the allocation of executive power to the
president made by Article II of the Constitution”).
60
See Train, 420 U.S. at 41 (“The sole issue before us is whether the 1972 Act permits the
Administrator to allot to the States under § 205(a) less than the entire amounts authorized to
be appropriated by § 207. We hold that the Act does not permit such action and affirm the
Court of Appeals.”).
61
S. REP. NO. 93-549, at III (1973).
62
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (noting that the
President’s power to issue an executive order directing the seizure of corporate plants must
stem from an act of Congress or the provisions of the Constitution).
63
S. REP. NO. 93-549, supra note 61.
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in either the Legislative or Executive branch knew how far those powers
reached.64
Nixon’s expansive view of Executive power also put democracy to
the test when he declared two national emergencies in order to give himself
undefined, unprecedented powers. Nixon declared the first emergency to
crush a strike by postal workers.65 The second emergency was declared in
response to the inflation crisis of 1971, when Nixon claimed he had
unprecedented authority to impose import controls to control inflation.66
Some scholars believe the Constitution also grants the President implied
powers to seize undefined presidential authority in response to a national
emergency, and at the time few parameters around that authority existed.67
Yet Nixon’s use of that authority, coupled with the abuses uncovered during
the Watergate investigation, showed that safeguards were needed to prevent
presidents from using emergency declarations to circumvent democratic
procedures.
As Congress attempted to carry out investigations of the Nixon
administration, it was stymied by bureaucratic delays that were enabled by
what a House Report later characterized as “major deficiencies in the
administration of the [FOIA].”68 This interference revealed a serious need to
reform FOIA so that Congress could force executive agencies to comply with
Congressional oversight requests.69
64

Id. at IV.
Stephanie Jurkowski, Emergency Powers, CORNELL LEGAL INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/emergency_powers [perma.cc/6FBT-3WUH] (July 2017).
66
Id.
67
See id. (“The Constitution does not expressly grant the President additional war powers or
other powers in times of national emergency. However, many scholars think that the Framers
implied these powers because the structural design of the Executive Branch enables it to act
faster than the Legislative Branch. Nevertheless, because the Constitution remains silent on
the issue, the Judiciary cannot grant these powers to the Executive Branch when it tries to
wield them. The courts will only recognize a right of the Executive Branch to use emergency
powers if Congress has granted such powers to the President.”). Notably, because the
Constitution is silent on what these powers are, there is no clear indication where their limits
lie, and therefore they have been used in a variety of circumstances and have encompassed
a range of specific functional powers. See id. (listing various national emergencies that
presidents have declared in the past, including the 1933 banking crisis, the 1950 communism
scare, the 1970 postal workers strike, and the 1971 inflation emergency).
68
H.R. REP. NO. 93-876, at 122 (1974). A full database of the legislative history of FOIA
and its subsequent Amendments is available at FOIA Legislative History, The National
Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/foia/foia-legislative-history [perma.cc/8LUYQ6VF] (last visited Oct. 18, 2021).
69
Dan Lopez, Thomas Blanton, Meredith Fuchs & Barbara Elias, Veto Battle 30 Years Ago
Set Freedom of Information Norms, The National Security Archive, GEO. WASH. UNIV.
(Nov. 23, 2004), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/index.htm [perma.cc/
65
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The investigations also revealed unethical activities related to
President Nixon’s campaign funds, including the creation of a “slush fund”
used for everything from funding illegal surveillance of political opponents
to improvements on Nixon’s summer homes.70 Congress also uncovered the
so-called “International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) affair,”
in which a corporation allegedly donated $400,000 to the Nixon campaign in
order to get the Department of Justice (DOJ) to settle an antitrust lawsuit.71
These discoveries revealed a need for greater oversight of campaign
financing.72
The Watergate investigations also revealed that U.S. intelligence
agencies had been turned inward on Nixon’s political rivals.73 This effort
59CQ-ET4L]. Ultimately, in response to these deficiencies, Congress passed the 1974
amendments to FOIA, discussed in detail in Part II, infra. Congress passed the amendments
twice with a strong enough majority to override President Ford’s initial veto. Robert P.
Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation over National Security
Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 67, 76 (1992).
President Ford believed judicial in camera review was unconstitutional because he believed
that it was the role of the executive, not the judiciary, to properly determine whether
investigative documents could safely be disclosed to the inquiring public. Id. at 78.
70
John M. Crewdson, Nixon's Taped Remarks on Apparent Slush Fund Called Key Evidence
in Rebozo Iniquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 1974), at 27, available at https://www.nytimes.
com/1974/12/09/archives/nixons-taped-remarks-onapparent-slush-fund-called-key-evid
ence-in.html [perma.cc/Q73X-N76H].
71
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The I.T.T. Affair and Why Public Financing Matters for Political
Conventions, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (March 19, 2014), https://www.brennancenter.org
/our-work/analysis-opinion/itt-affair-and-why-public-financing-matters-politicalconventions [perma.cc/VSL7-362X].
72
Ultimately, this resulted in the creation of the Federal Election Commission and other
electoral regulatory reforms, discussed in detail in Part II, infra. See also Torres-Spelliscy,
supra note 71 (explaining the DOJ’s conduct during the ITT affair was illegal when it
happened under the Tillman Act, and the incident was the impetus for the Tunney Act of
1974, “which requires anti-trust settlements go before a judge instead of being settled by the
DOJ alone”). Bi-partisan legislation passed in 2014 rolled back certain public funding
provisions of the post-Watergate election oversight reforms, but the Tunney Act remained in
place. Id.
73
U.S. Senate Hist. Off., Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/investigations/ChurchCommittee.htm [perma.cc/X8PF-97SQ] (“Despite
these numerous challenges, the Church Committee investigated and identified a wide range
of intelligence abuses by federal agencies, including the CIA, FBI, Internal Revenue Service,
and National Security Agency. In the course of their work, investigators identified programs
that had never before been known to the American public, including NSA’s Projects
SHAMROCK and MINARET, programs which monitored wire communications to and from
the United States and shared some of that data with other intelligence agencies. Committee
staff researched the FBI’s long-running program of ‘covert action designed to disrupt and
discredit the activities of groups and individuals deemed a threat to the social order,’ known
as COINTELPRO. The FBI included among the program’s many targets organizations such
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included surveillance conducted by the FBI and CIA.74 While Congress was
concerned for years that these agencies would inappropriately surveil
Americans,75 the concerns came to a head during Watergate.76 Nixon
attempted to use his executive power under the guise of national security to
create an “intelligence committee” to provide “better intelligence
operations.”77 Documents relating to this intelligence committee were
classified as containing top secret content.78 One mission undertaken by this
committee was investigating who was responsible for publishing the
Pentagon Papers that detailed U.S. involvement in Vietnam.79 If Nixon had
suspected certain individuals of committing espionage and revealing
classified U.S. information, he could—in theory—have taken steps to have
them federally indicted for having violated the 1917 Espionage Act.80
Instead, he had intelligence officers burglarize the offices of certain
suspects.81
Concerns related to federal advisory committees also arose and
culminated in the passage of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, discussed
in Part II, infra, before the investigations even ended.82 In sum, the Watergate

as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and
individuals such as Martin Luther King, Jr., as well as local, state, and federal elected
officials.”).
74
Id.
75
Concerns about intelligence groups surveilling nonviolent activist groups can be found
throughout the Congressional Record. See 117 CONG. REC. 13,982 (1971) (statement of Rep.
James H. Scheuer) (entering Frank Donner, The Theory and Practice of American Political
Intelligence, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Apr. 22, 1971) into the Congressional Record) (“At an
ever-increasing rate the activities of antiwar, anti-Establishment, civil rights, black militants,
student, and youth groups are being recorded and compiled. Lists and dossiers are coded,
computerized, stored, and made accessible to all branches of the intelligence network . . .
political intelligence indiscriminately sweeps into its net the mild dissenters along with those
drawn to violence.”). These groups spanned the American ideological spectrum. See id.
(“peaceful, moderate, lawful organizations—from the NAACP to the Fellowship of
Reconciliation—become intelligence targets on the theory that they are linked to
communism or subversion.”).
76
EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11451, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT (FISA): AN OVERVIEW 1 (2021) (“Following revelations regarding widespread privacy
violations by the federal government during the Watergate era, Congress enacted FISA to
establish guidelines for government collection of foreign intelligence.”).
77
CIA, INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES UNDER FIRE FOR WATERGATE ROLE 58 (2002), available
at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp75b00380r000200010022-9
[perma.cc/6GRE-RBBP].
78
Id. at 58.
79
Id. at 59.
80
18 U.S.C § 798 (1996).
81
CIA, supra note 77, at 59.
82
BERGER & TAUSANOVITCH, supra note 2.
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investigations revealed a need for numerous new democratic safeguards to
keep the executive and the agencies under its command in check.
II. POST-WATERGATE REFORMS
In response to the Nixon administration, Congress passed a series of
reforms intended to create a more transparent and accountable government.
The goal was to ensure that officials under the President’s command could
be held accountable when they abused or exceeded their authority. In
pursuing this goal, Congress reinforced the external constitutional safeguards
that allow Congress and the courts to check the Executive. Core to the
concept of separated powers is the reality that the President has limited,
implied powers, and may not run the Executive Branch with unconstrained
discretion. This idea ran directly counter to President Nixon’s own
conception of presidential powers, which he believed to be unlimited.
The wide-ranging Watergate reforms may be separated into three
broad categories. First, in response to clear obfuscation by federal agencies,
Congress passed administrative oversight measures to increase agency
transparency and accountability. Second, in order to expressly rebuff Nixon’s
undemocratic advocacy for a system dominated by the Executive branch,
Congress passed measures to directly limit the authority of the President.
Third, to ensure effective investigations within the administrative state and to
ensure the President cannot unilaterally end investigations, Congress created
watchdog mechanisms to investigate alleged wrongdoing.
A. Agency Transparency and Oversight Reforms
1. Federal Advisory Committee Act
One of the first steps Congress took while the Watergate
investigations were still ongoing was to impose oversight measures on
shadowy “advisory” committees through the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA). These advisory committees, typically comprised of individuals
representing special interest groups, have been viewed by presidents and
legislators across the political spectrum as a potentially corrupting force in
administrative law.83 The purpose of FACA was two-fold.84 First, it was

83

See WENDY GINSBERG & CASEY BURGAT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44253, FEDERAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEES: AN INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 17 (2016) (presenting the
history of Congressional oversight of executive advisory committees, including legislation
passed in 1842 and 1909).
84
Kurtis A. Kemper, Construction and Application of the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
160 A.L.R. Fed. 483, (2000).
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designed to reduce wasteful expenditure on advisory committees.85 Second,
it was aimed at making de facto presidential advisory committees more
identifiable and accountable to the public. 86
FACA was intended to curb the influence of advisory committees87
by imposing certain processes on federal advisory committees “to ensure that
advice by the various advisory committees formed over the years is objective
and accessible to the public.”88 It prescribes standards for agencies to follow
when they establish advisory committees, creates a way for Congress and the
Executive to enforce those standards, places temporal limitations on the
existence of a committee, provides guidelines to reduce the improper
influence of advisory committees, requires a federal employee to be involved
in advisory committee meetings, and makes advisory meetings and
documents available to the public. 89
In the decades before FACA, advisory committee abuse and waste
was well known to government officials and the general public.90 Throughout
the 1950s, DOJ laid out guidelines to curb the influence of private industries
over the federal government. Executive Order No. 1100791 enforced much of
the DOJ guidance for committees and set time limits. Circular No. A-63 was
issued by the Bureau of Budget in 1964 and was later cited by the executive
branch during Congressional hearings to show that there was no need for
more legislation with regard to advisory committees.92
While the House and Senate hammered out details on what would
become FACA through the Spring of 1972, on June 5th, President Nixon
signed Executive Order No. 1167193 which instead vested OMB with
oversight of advisory committees.94 To the extent this was an attempt by
Nixon to convince Congress that FACA was unnecessary, it was undercut by
the arrest95 of burglars in the Watergate Hotel twelve days later, and further
85

Id.
Id.
87
GINSBERG & BURGAT, supra note 83, at 3.
88
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) Management Overview, U.S. GEN. SERVS.
ADMIN., https://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104514 [perma.cc/ZYP8-TPZ5] (last updated
January 28, 2018).
89
Kemper, supra note 81.
90
GINSBERG & BURGAT, supra note 83.
91
Exec. Order No. 11,007, 3 C.F.R. § 182 (1962).
92
GINSBERG & BURGAT, supra note 83.
93
Exec. Order No. 11,671. 3 C.FR. § 388 (1973).
94
GINSBERG & BURGAT, supra note 83.
95
Document for June 17th: Security Officer’s Log of the Watergate Office Building Showing
Entry for June 17, 1972, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/todaysdoc/index.html?dod-date=617#:~:text=During%20the%20early%20hours%20of,the%20
Democratic%20National%20Committee%20Headquarters [perma.cc/P8A7-QK8C] (last
visited Feb. 24, 2021).
86

52

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[December 2021

on September 15, 1972,96 when Nixon associates were indicted by a federal
grand jury for the break-in. Congress passed FACA later in September, and
President Nixon signed the Act in October.
FACA was tested in January of 2001, when President George W.
Bush created the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG),97
and tapped Vice President Dick Cheney to run it. After the NEPDG published
a report in May 2001,98 the Sierra Club and Judicial Watch filed suit alleging
that, because the committee met in private, with non-governmental
employees, and documents that the committee produced were not made
public, the committee violated FACA.99 When the organizations requested
discovery of the committee’s documents, Cheney sought an order of
mandamus to stop any discovery, which was at first denied. In 2005, after a
remand by the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed
the case, concluding that the NEPDC was not covered by FACA because it
was not an “advisory committee” within the meaning of the statute. No nonfederal employees had a right to vote on committee matters or exercise veto
powers, so those members had no duty to the public under FACA.100 After
the incident, the viability of FACA as a check on Executive branch corruption
came into question.
2. 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act
Another measure Congress adopted to strengthen oversight was the
passage of amendments to the Freedom of Information Act to promote
transparency in government, in recognition that “if the pertinent and
necessary information on government activities is denied the public, the
result is a weakening of the democratic process.”101 The amendments
introduced a number of key reforms, including reforms intended to overcome
“extraordinary delays” in the FOIA adjudication process by creating
administrative timetables to control the review process.102 The reforms also
96

Associated Press, From Break-in to Pardon, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 1997), at 29, available at
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1997-06-08-mn-1346-story.html
[perma.cc/EK4V-47C9].
97
In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
98
NAT’L ENERGY POL’Y DEV. GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY (2001).
99
Jud. Watch, Inc. v. Nat'l Energy Pol’y Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 29 (D.D.C. 2002)
100
In re Cheney, 406 F.3d at 729.
101
H.R. REP. NO. 93-876, at 123 (1974).
102
See e.g., S. REP. NO. 98-854, at 165 (1974) (noting the Supreme Court in Renegotiation
Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1 (1974) held, in the Report’s words, that
“FOIA confers jurisdiction on the courts to enjoin administrative proceedings pending a
judicial determination of the applicability of the Act to documents involved in those
proceedings”). In the Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the proposed amendments, to
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ensured agencies could not abuse FOIA’s foreign policy exemption for
inappropriate purposes by providing for in camera review of FOIA denials
based on the exemption and by narrowing the exemption’s applicability.103
First, the amendments created procedural administrative timelines to
force agencies to process FOIA requests at a reasonable pace.104 As amended,
FOIA provides that when an agency receives a request, it “must determine
within twenty [working] days . . . whether to comply with such request.”105
The D.C. Circuit has held that
in order to make a ‘determination’ within the statutory time
periods and thereby trigger the administrative exhaustion
requirement, the agency need not actually produce the
documents within the relevant time period . . . [b]ut the agency
must at least indicate within the relevant time period the scope
of the documents it will produce and the exemptions it will
claim with respect to any withheld documents.106
Additionally, Congress created mechanisms to ensure these
timeframes were complied with, including sanctions on agencies that fail to
comply.107
Second, the amendments narrowed FOIA’s foreign policy exemption
to reduce the ability of agencies to shield documents from requests.108 For
example, the amendments narrowed the circumstances under which the
exemption applies.109 They also created a two-part test for administrative
Committee suggested that the amendments address this problem by expediting the timeframe
upon which administrative determinations to withhold documents could be subject to judicial
review. Id.
103
H.R. REP. NO. 4960 (1973). This was a direct response to the Supreme Court’s holding in
EPA v. Mink that documents designated as “classified” on foreign policy grounds is an action
delegated to agencies, not the courts. 410 U.S. 73, 81–82 (1973); S. REP. NO. 98-854, at 166
(1974). In camera review was included in the final amendments. Id. This reflects the desire
by Congress to enhance judicial oversight over the FOIA process. See id.
104
The agency has 20 days after receiving a FOIA request to determine whether to comply
with such request and shall immediately notify the person making such request. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(6)(A).
105
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i).
106
Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Washington v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 711 F.3d 180,
189 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
107
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(F)(i).
108
Id. § 552(b); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 7 (2019), available at https://www.justice.gov/oip/page/
file/1248371/download [perma.cc/L49D-JJ63] (“The 1974 FOIA amendments considerably
narrowed the overall scope of the Act's law enforcement and national security exemptions,
and also broadened many of its procedural provisions – such as those relating to fees, time
limits, segregability, and in camera inspection by the courts.”).
109
Attorney General's Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the FOIA, U.S. DEP’T OF
Just. (1975), https://www.justice.gov/oip/attorney-generals-memorandum-1974-amend
ments-foia [perma.cc/9TMQ-77HN] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021).
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officers to apply when determining whether records can be withheld.110 This
test permits the withholding of matters that are (1) specifically authorized
under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy, and (2) are in fact properly
classified pursuant to such Executive Order.111
As with the foreign policy exemption, the 1974 amendments also
narrowed the exemption for investigatory records compiled for law
enforcement purposes.112 The Act was amended to specify six potential
harms that qualify a document for the exemption.113 Thus, after
administrators determine a document is an investigatory document compiled
for law enforcement purposes, they must ask whether releasing the document
would result in one of those six specific harms.
Documents withheld under the foreign policy and law enforcement
exemptions may be reviewed in camera by a court to determine the propriety
of the withholding under the substantive factors of the Act.114 This review is
under a de novo standard.115 Any document, regardless of the exemption
claimed, may be reviewed, even if it contains classified information. Upon
inspection, any reasonably segregable portion of a record is to be provided
after appropriate redactions are made.116 While this provides an important
safeguard, in camera examination is not automatic.117 Before a court orders
110

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A)–(B).
Id.; EDWARD H. LEVI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT AND AGENCIES CONCERNING THE AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT (1975), available at https://www.justice.gov/oip/attorney-generalsmemorandum-1974-amendments-foia [https://perma.cc/W7L8-27TR].
112
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
113
The six circumstances under which a document may be withheld are if releasing the
document would: (1) interfere with enforcement proceedings; (2) deprive a person of a right
to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; (3) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy; (4) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled
by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential
information furnished only by the confidential source; (5) disclose investigative techniques
and procedures; and (6) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
Id.
114
Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
115
Id.
116
The agency records sought by a FOIA plaintiff often consist of non-exempt factual
information intertwined with exempt material. In response to such cases, Congress in 1974
amended the FOIA to provide that “any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be
provided . . . after deletion of the portions which are exempt.” Lisa A. Krupicka,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act—1984, 1985 DUKE L.J. 742, 787
(1985).
117
Although courts have recognized persuasive policy reasons to adopt a per se rule that in
camera review will be granted, they have declined to do so because such a per se rule would
111

Vol. 7:1]

Executive Accountability Legislation

55

inspection, the agency must be given an opportunity to establish that the
documents are clearly exempt.118 Since 1974, courts have almost always
ruled in favor of the agency after conducting review.119 Commentators have
argued that courts’ deference to agencies regarding foreign policy
information misreads the history of the FOIA, and deference is not an
adequate reflection of the responsibilities assigned to the courts in reviewing
FOIA cases.120
3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
An additional agency oversight measure Congress passed in 1978 was
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which limited electronic
surveillance of Americans to circumstances in which agencies were
collecting foreign intelligence.121 Senator Ted Kennedy, one of the law’s
proponents, explained the legislature’s motivations for FISA, stating that “the
full Senate at long last has the opportunity to place foreign intelligence
electronic surveillance under the rule of law . . . The abuses of recent history
sanctioned in the name of national security . . . highlight the need for more
effective statutory controls and congressional oversight.”122 These abuses
contravene the clear grant by Congress of broad discretion to trial judges. See Ctr. for Auto
Safety v. EPA, 731 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (declining to adopt a per se rule requiring the
court to conduct an in camera review of documents claimed to be exempted per Exemption
5 of FOIA and noting that such a rule would oppose Congressional intention to afford trial
judges broad discretion on the issue).
118
S. REP. No. 98-854, at 166 (1974).
119
See Deyling, supra note 69, at 90 (“If weighed at all, plaintiff's evidence is never strong
enough to overcome what has become a de facto presumption of government victory once
reasonably specific government affidavits are filed.”).
120
Id. (“This article contends that one reason plaintiffs seldom persuade courts to order the
government to release ‘secret’ information is that judicial treatment of these cases fails to
fully implement the reforms Congress intended when it passed the 1974 amendments. Rather
than expanding the scope of judicial inquiry into the procedural and substantive legality of
withholding information, opinions issued both before and after the 1974 amendments have
established a lenient standard of review in FOIA national security cases. That standard, in
essence, will validate any ‘reasonable’ executive agency decision to withhold such
information.”).
121
See EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11451, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA): AN OVERVIEW 1 (2021) (“FISA defines ‘[f]oreign intelligence
information’ as information relating to a foreign power or that generally concerns the ability
of the United States to protect against international terrorism or a potential attack by a foreign
power or agent of a foreign power. Though Congress initially limited FISA to regulating
government use of electronic surveillance, Congress subsequently amended FISA to regulate
other intelligence-gathering practices, such as physical searches, the use of pen registers and
trap and trace devices and compelling the production of certain types of business records.”)
(citation omitted).
122
124 CONG. REC. 10,887 (1978) (statement of Sen. Edward “Ted” Kennedy).
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included use of warrantless electronic and physical surveillance on anti-war
protestors, a member of Congress, and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.—all made
public after Watergate.123
The Department of Justice has further explained that “[t]hrough FISA,
Congress sought to provide judicial and congressional oversight of foreign
intelligence surveillance activities while maintaining the secrecy necessary
to effectively monitor national security threats. FISA was initially enacted in
1978 and sets out procedures for physical and electronic surveillance and
collection of foreign intelligence information.”124 FISA has been amended to
address “electronic surveillance, pen registers, trap and trace devices,
physical searches, and business records.”125
FISA also provides a framework to monitor electronic surveillance by
federal agencies and safeguard against abuse.126 It contains several important
provisions. First, it provides procedural safeguards with which agencies must
comply.127 Second, it establishes a special court—known as Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)—for purposes of FISA oversight and
review.128 The FISC is composed of federal judges appointed by the Chief
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Third, it creates a probable cause standard
of proof for courts to apply in evaluating applications for FISA warrants.129
Fourth, it forbids the covert surveillance of American citizens under the
Act.130
FISA allows agencies only to surveil “agents of a foreign power.”131
The criteria to determine whether someone is an agent of a foreign power
vary depending on whether an individual is an American citizen.132 For
noncitizens, an “agent of a foreign power” includes not only foreign
123

James G. McAdams, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, An Overview, FED. L.
ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CTR., 4–5, https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/imported
_files/training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/research-bysubject/miscellaneous/ForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct.pdf [perma.cc/387G-CLSF] (last
visited Feb. 24, 2021).
124
BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 (FISA) (2013), https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/
statutes/1286 [perma.cc/Y6AL-64VC].
125
Id.
126
See, e.g., Cedric Logan, The FISA Wall and Federal Investigations, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 209, 219–21 (2011) (discussing the FISA framework’s safeguards against abuse by
governmental electronic surveillance, known commonly as “The Wall.”).
127
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1813.
128
Id. §§ 1801–1885(c).
129
Id. §1805(a)(2).
130
Id. §1802(a)(1).
131
Id. § 1802(a)(1)(A).
132
See ELIZABETH GOITEIN & FAIZA PATEL, WHAT WENT WRONG WITH THE FISA COURT
17 (2015)(stating that the criteria to determine whether someone is an agent of a foreign
power varies depending on the citizenship status of the potential agent).
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governments, but also “factions of foreign nations; entities that foreign
governments control; international terrorist groups; foreign-based political
organizations; and foreign entities engaged in the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.”133 By contrast, an American qualifies as an “agent of a
foreign power” only if they have some connection to criminal activity.134 This
was meant to protect Americans from surveillance based only on tenuous
connections to foreign entities. Congress did not anticipate this would create
significant roadblocks to legitimate surveillance because it anticipated that
most of the persons under surveillance would be violating the criminal
espionage laws.135
Furthermore, FISA only permits surveillance of agents of foreign
entities for the purpose of obtaining “foreign intelligence information.”
Congress specifically narrowed the definition of foreign intelligence
information to exclude information such as the opinions of congressional
members on foreign relations.136 To that end, FISA requires a showing that
any surveillance of a United States “person” is “necessary,” not just relevant,
to the conduct of foreign affairs.137
Through the 1990s there was an effort to make sure that the “primary
purpose” of FISA surveillance was securing foreign intelligence as opposed
to a criminal investigation.138 This “primary purpose” standard created a
“wall” between the foreign intelligence investigations done with FISA
surveillance and criminal investigations done by other law enforcement
agencies.139
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent
passage of the USA PATRIOT Act diminished both the “wall” and the
“primary purpose” standard. In November of 2002, the U.S. Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR)—the appellate court
charged with reviewing decisions the FISC—met for its first time ever and
overturned the FISC’s holding that the counterintelligence branches of the
FBI and DOJ could not share FISA information with the criminal prosecution

133

Id. at 22.
Id.
135
S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 21 (1978).
136
See GOITEIN & PATEL, supra note 132, at 17 (“Senators were concerned that the definition
of ‘foreign intelligence information’ in an early draft of the bill was too broad because it
went beyond national security to include information on ‘the conduct of the foreign affairs
of the United States.’ One Senator wrote to the Chair of the Intelligence Committee pointing
out that the views of members of Congress could ‘easily be classified as information
“‘essential to the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States,”’ suggesting that
Congress itself could be surveilled under FISA.”).
137
Id.
138
McAdams, supra note 123, at 4–5.
139
Id. at 5.
134
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branches of the agencies.140 In overturning the FISC, the FISCR cited the
congressional intent behind the PATRIOT Act that law enforcement and
foreign intelligence officials better collaborate to prevent future terrorist
attacks.141 The PATRIOT Act also changed the standard for FISA
surveillance from the “primary purpose” standard to a standard “that a
significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence
information”142—a much lower bar to clear.
B. Measures to Limit Executive Powers
1. 1974 FECA Amendments and the creation of the FEC
The Watergate investigations uncovered a number of shady uses by
the Nixon campaign of campaign contributions. Scholars have explained
“[t]he 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)
responded directly to the abuses of the 1972 campaign.”143 The goal of the
amendments was to preserve the ability of ordinary citizens to make
contributions to their preferred candidates, but eliminate the ability of
corporations and wealthy individuals to have a disproportionate influence
over the political process.144 The legislature considered radical reforms to
American campaign finance, including the introduction of a public campaign
finance system.145 However, the legislature dropped that idea in favor of a
model in which private contributions were preserved, with limits enforced by
a centralized body, the FEC. 146 This model represented a compromise
between the most hardcore campaign finance reform advocates and moderate
colleagues. The compromise preserved private contributions in exchange for
increased spending limits for House and Senate campaigns and an FEC model
in which the Commission was composed of a multi-member, bipartisan,

140

Id.
Id. at 7–8.
142
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B).
143
BERGER & TAUSANOVITCH, supra note 2, at 7; see also Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H.
Bowman, Coordinated Expenditure Limits: Can They Be Saved? 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 133,
134 (2000) (noting that the legislative record before Congress when it passed the 1974
Amendments “was replete with specific examples of improper attempts to obtain
governmental favor in return for large campaign contributions,” and that “[r]evelations of
huge contributions from the dairy industry, a number of corporations (illegally) and
ambassadors and potential ambassadors . . . dramatize[d] . . . the widespread concerns over
the problem of undue influence”) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839-40 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
144
120 CONG. REC. 10,342 (1974).
145
Id.
146
Id.
141
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supervisory board.147 The new limits set campaign contribution caps at
$1,000 from individuals and $5,000 from political action committees
(PACs).148 They also limited individual expenditures on behalf of candidates
to $1,000, though this provision was later ruled unconstitutional in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission.149 Additionally, limits were placed
on the amount campaigns were permitted to spend on races.150
While the new campaign limits were strong, they would not be
effective unless they were paired with an enforcement mechanism.151 The
FEC consists of six presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed
commissioners, as well as one non-voting staffer from both the House and
the Senate.152 Commissioners serve for six years and no more than three may
belong to the same political party at one time.153 Their terms are staggered so
two commissioners are supposed to be appointed every two years.154 While
many decisions made by the Commission require a mere majority vote to take
effect, the most important decisions require four votes.155 This means that a
quorum is required for the Commission to initiate civil enforcement actions
147
See Campaign Financing Reform, 32 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2691 (Oct. 5, 1974)
(explaining the terms of the compromise in detail); see also Debra Burke, Twenty Years After
the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974: Look Who’s Running Now, 99
DICK. L. REV. 357, 362–63 (1995) (“The compromise passed both chambers and became
law, representing the greatest reform in the electoral process since the passage of the
Seventeenth Amendment.”).
148
52 U.S.C. § 30116.
149
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010) (“Limits on
independent expenditures, such as § 441b, have a chilling effect extending well beyond the
Government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. The anticorruption interest is
not sufficient to displace the speech here in question.”). In Citizens United, the Supreme
Court famously held that corporate monetary expenditures for “express advocacy” in favor
of a political candidate are equivalent to speech, and therefore are protected under the First
Amendment. While some contribution limits in the original FECA text are constitutional
because they further an important government interest in preventing corruption (such as
direct contributions to candidates), others were held unconstitutional bars on protected
speech. Id. at 340 (“[P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it
[whether] by design or inadvertence. Laws [that burden political] speech are ‘subject to strict
scrutiny,’ which requires the Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’”).
150
52 U.S.C. § 30116(b).
151
See Mission and History, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/missionand-history/ [perma.cc/696Y-49XD] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (“[W]ithout a central
administrative authority, the campaign finance laws were difficult to enforce. Following
reports of serious financial abuses in the 1972 presidential campaign, Congress amended the
Federal Election Campaign Act in 1974 to set limits . . . The 1974 amendments also
established an independent agency, the FEC. The FEC opened its doors in 1975.”).
152
52 U.S.C. § 30106.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. § 30106, 30107(6)–(9).
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for FECA violations, investigate potential FECA violations, issue advisory
opinions, or issue rules.156 Without a quorum sitting on the FEC, FECA is
effectively unenforceable.
2. Impoundment Control Act
Congress passed the Impoundment Control Act (ICA) in 1974,
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Train,157 discussed in Part I,
supra, to place express limits on the Executive’s authority to impound
funds.158 Congress’s motivating concern was a President substituting his own
policy judgment for express statutory prerogatives set by Congress.159 When
President Nixon impounded the water pollution control funds at issue in
Train, he did so based on policy preferences that had been expressly rejected
when Congress overrode his veto. This circumvention of the veto was the
root of Congress’s concerns, rather than Richard Nixon’s specific
motivations. Thus, the objective of the Act was to assure that the practice of
impounding funds does not become a mechanism for furthering the
President’s policy agenda at the expense of Congress’s agenda.160

156

Id.
According to the House Budget Committee website, “Congress passed the ICA in
response to President Nixon’s executive overreach—his Administration refused to release
Congressionally appropriated funds for certain programs he opposed. While the U.S.
Constitution broadly grants Congress the power of the purse, the President—through the
White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and executive agencies—is
responsible for the actual spending of funds. The ICA created a process the President must
follow if he or she seeks to delay or cancel funding that Congress has provided.” The
Impoundment Control Act of 1974: What Is It? Why Does It Matter?, H. COMM. ON THE
BUDGET
(Oct. 23, 2019) https://budget.house.gov/publications/report/impoundmentcontrol-act-1974-what-it-why-does-it-matter [perma.cc/Z3VC-AR6W] [hereinafter H.
COMM. ON THE BUDGET].
158
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-331564, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET—WITHHOLDING OF UKRAINE SECURITY ASSISTANCE 5 (2016). (discussing the
direct limits expressed upon the Executive’s authority to impound funds).
159
Thus, it doesn’t matter if withholding the aid was for proper or corrupt reasons. It doesn’t
matter what the reasons are at all. Congress specifically passed this law because it didn’t
believe the President was a good person to be making this decision. See e.g., H. COMM. ON
THE BUDGET, supra note 157 (explaining Congress’ concern that President Nixon had
usurped the constitutional role of Congress by substituting his policy judgment for that of
the legislature).
160
See generally H.R. REP. NO. 100-313, at 66–67 (1987). See also S. REP. NO. 93-688, at
75 (1974); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 158, at 5 (“The Constitution grants the
President no unilateral authority to withhold funds from obligation. See B-135564, July 26,
1973. Instead, Congress has vested the President with strictly circumscribed authority to
impound, or withhold, budget authority only in limited circumstances as expressly provided
in the ICA. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 681–688.”).
157
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To prevent a rogue president from withholding funds, the ICA
imposes strict procedures which the president must follow to impound funds.
161
The Act operates on the premise that the president is required to obligate
funds appropriated by Congress, unless otherwise authorized.162 Before an
impoundment can occur, the president must send a “special message”
specifying “the amount of budget authority which he proposes to be rescinded
or which is to be so reserved” and “the reasons why the budget authority
should be rescinded or is to be so reserved.”163
Impoundments may take two forms: deferrals and rescissions.164 A
deferral is a temporary withholding of funds. A deferral may not last longer
than the end of the fiscal year in which the President communicates a message
of the impoundment to Congress.165 There are only three specific
circumstances in which the President may defer funding for a program.166
Furthermore, whether a deferral can actually occur ultimately depends on
whether Congress approves of the deferral after being notified of the
president’s special message.167
Rescissions are permanent cancellations of funds.168 As with a
deferral, the president must send a special message to Congress to trigger a
rescission.169 However, the special message requesting a recession must
explain the proposed rescission, the reasons for it, and its budgetary,
economic, and programmatic effects.170 Like a deferral, Congress must
approve a rescission. However, upon delivery of the special message, the
president may withhold funding for up to forty-five legislative days.171 If a
law approving the rescission is not enacted at the end of that timeframe, the
money must be released.172 The special messages accompanying a request
161

Allan Lichtman, What Law Did Donald Trump Break?, THE HILL (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/479547-what-law-did-donald-trump-break
[perma.cc/TPR8-LA85].
162
See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 158, at 5 (“An appropriations act is a law
like any other; therefore, unless Congress has enacted a law providing otherwise, the
President must take care to ensure that appropriations are prudently obligated during their
period of availability.”).
163
2 U.S.C. § 683(a).
164
See H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, supra note 157 (stating impoundments may take two
forms of either deferrals or recessions).
165
2 U.S.C. § 684.
166
Those three circumstances are: when providing for contingencies; achieving budgetary
savings made possible through improved operational efficiency; and as specifically provided
by law. Id. § 684.
167
Id. § 683(b).
168
Id. § 683.
169
Id. § 683(a).
170
Id. § 683(a)(1)–(5); H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, supra note 157.
171
2 U.S.C. § 683(b).
172
H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, supra note 157.
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for impoundment, regardless of whether it is a deferral or rescission, must
provide detailed and specific reasoning to justify the withholding, as set out
in the ICA.173
However, if funds are impounded in violation of the ICA, the
enforcement mechanism to free those funds is weak. The Act authorizes the
Comptroller General to initiate a civil action against any party preventing the
allocation of funds,174 but there are no specific penalties imposed on agencies.
In modern times, this has proven to be a flaw in the Act’s efficacy.
In addition to the prohibition on executive impoundments, the Act
also created the Congressional Budget Office—a nonpartisan, independent
legislative agency that estimates the effects of legislation on the federal
budget.175 It also directed the congressional budget committees to project
spending for the next fiscal year. 176
3. National Emergencies Act
Enacted in 1976, the National Emergencies Act (NEA) created a
formal process which the President must follow to declare a state of
emergency,177 including publishing notice of the emergency in the Federal
Register and transmitting notice directly to Congress.178 Once an emergency
is declared, it may last up to one year, unless the President takes formal action
to continue it.179 Under this scenario, Congress retains authority to terminate
the emergency after the one year mark.180 The Act also requires the President
to report which emergency powers he intends to utilize during the emergency,
and what expenditures will be made in exercise of those authorities.181

173

2 U.S.C. §§ 683–84.
Id. § 687.
175
See A Short Primer on the Congressional Budget Office, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED.
BUDGET (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.crfb.org/blogs/short-primer-congressional-budgetoffice [perma.cc/3T58-WPEZ] (“Generally, CBO ‘scores’ the cost of legislation by
estimating the effect it might have on revenue and spending relative to the CBO baseline.
For example, if a program was projected to cost $100 billion over ten years under CBO's
baseline and would cost $90 billion under new legislation, that legislation would be scored
as saving $10 billion.”).
176
See Joyce, supra note 49, at 3 (stating that the Committee was to “propose procedures for
improving congressional control over budgetary outlay and receipt totals and to assure full
coordination of an overall view of each year’s budgetary outlays with an overall view of the
anticipated revenue for that fiscal year”).
177
50 U.S.C. § 1631.
178
Id. §§ 1621, 1631.
179
Id. § 1601.
180
Id.
181
Id. § 1641.
174
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There are currently just over thirty active national emergencies,
ranging in age from the 1979 sanctions on Iran to President Trump’s order to
redirect military funds to build a border wall.182 The vast majority of active
emergencies are economic sanctions on foreign nations controlled by the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).183 Although the
NEA requires both Houses of Congress to convene to discuss ending
emergencies declared by the President within six months of their
declaration,184 neither House has actually held meetings.185
C. Watchdog Mechanisms
1. Inspector General Act
In addition to transparency safeguards, Congress created offices of
inspectors general in various agencies to serve as internal agency watchdogs.
The concept of an “Inspector General” (IG) existed since the 1950s.186
However, the Watergate investigations uncovered mismanagement of
administrative programs and weaknesses within internal investigative
units.187 The Inspector General Act of 1978 (IGA) was put in place “as a
means of ensuring integrity and accountability in the Executive Branch.”188
It created offices of inspectors general (OIGs) at twelve federal agencies, later
expanded to 73.189 The law190 empowers OIGs to audit and investigate
182
Kathy Gilsinan, In 1995, the U.S. Declared a State of Emergency. It Never Ended, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/01/
trump-renews-24-year-old-terrorism-state-emergency/581050/?utm_medium=offsite&utm_
source=yahoo&utm_campaign=yahoo-non-hosted [perma.cc/B54Y-9V8E].
183
ANDREW BOYLE, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CHECKING THE PRESIDENT’S SANCTION
POWERS (2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/BCJ-128%20I
EEPA%20report.pdf [perma.cc/CL9V-TCQX] (documenting that the IEEPA was the sole or
primary authority for 65 of 71 emergency declarations since 1976).
184
50 U.S.C. § 1622(b).
185
Chris Edelson, An Expert on National Emergencies Explains Whether Trump Declaring
One Over the Southern Border is Legal, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 15, 2019),
https://www.businessinsider.com/congress-has-the-power-to-end-a-national-emergency2019-1 [perma.cc/GX6C-79WH]; Catherine Padhi, Emergencies Without End: A Primer on
Federal States of Emergency, LAWFARE (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/emer
gencies-without-end-primer-federal-states-emergency [perma.cc/3L28-3KZX].
186
KATHRYN A. FRANCIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45450, STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A PRIMER 1 (2019).
187
Id. at 1.
188
About the OIG, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.ssa.gov/
about-oig [perma.cc/5769-9GYM] (last visited June 30, 2018) [hereinafter About the OIG].
189
MORTON ROSENBERG, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, WHEN CONGRESS COMES CALLING
103 (2009), available at https://archive.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/
Chapter-9.pdf. [perma.cc/GK9T-BQAN].
190
See 5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 (vesting Inspectors General with authority to oversee agencies).
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agencies, to report the results of these investigations to Congress, and to make
recommendations to resolve problems that are uncovered.191 The legislative
history of the Act provides further insight into its general purpose. Congress
believed expanding IGs to more agencies would address the issues made clear
by Watergate. Congress also believed that IGs needed to be independent to
fulfill their purpose.192
The IGA directs IGs to serve three statutory purposes.193 First, IGs
are expected “to conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to
programs and operations of” the agencies in which their office resides.
Second, they should “provide leadership and coordination,” and
recommendations designed to promote “economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration of, and to prevent and detect fraud and
abuse in,” administrative programs.194 Third, IGs are expected “to provide a
means for keeping the head of the [host agency] and the Congress fully and
currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of” agency programs and operations.195
The IGA further empowers IGs to accomplish these purposes through
substantive provisions. First, it authorizes specific OIGs in key federal
departments. Originally, the Act applied to twelve agencies: the Department
of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, the Department of the Interior, the Department of
Labor, the Department of Transportation, the Community Services
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the General Services
Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the
Small Business Administration, and the Veterans’ Administration. Over time,
OIGs have been established in many other agencies throughout the federal
government.196
Second, the Act contains appointment and removal procedures to
insulate IGs from political pressure. An IG is appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and may be removed by the President,
or transferred elsewhere within the agency.197 An agency head or subordinate
may not prevent or prohibit an IG investigation, but the Act does not
otherwise provide protection for IGs.198 The President may remove an IG and
191

About the OIG, supra note 188.
FRANCIS, supra note 186, at 21.
193
5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 § 2(1)–(3).
194
Id. § 2(2).
195
Id. § 2(3).
196
A full directory of the 73 federal inspectors general is available at Inspectors General
Directory, COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY,
https://www.ignet.gov/content/inspectors-general-directory [perma.cc/6YCB-6MKP] (last
visited Oct. 31, 2021).
197
5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 § 3.
198
Id. § 3(a).
192
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need only transmit a message to Congress communicating the reason for
removal at least thirty days prior to it occurring.199
Third, the Act imposes substantive duties on Inspectors General.200
These duties include overseeing audits and investigations relating to the
programs and operations of the host agency;201 making recommendations to
Congress in semiannual reports for the prevention and detection of fraud and
abuse;202 supervising activities carried out or financed by the host agency for
the purpose of promoting agency efficiency or preventing and detecting fraud
and abuse;203 overseeing relationships between the host agency and other
federal, state, and local agencies, and nongovernmental entities regarding
agency programs;204 and keeping both the agency head and Congress “fully
and currently informed” concerning fraud, abuse, and other serious
problems.205
Fourth, the Act empowers IGs to conduct independent internal
investigations.206 It guarantees timely access to agency records,207 authority
to interview agency officials under oath,208 prompt access to the agency
head,209 authority to appoint his/her own subordinates,210 and authority to
enter into contracts for the purposes of carrying out investigations.211 Because
IGs report to both agency heads and Congress, they are well positioned to
advise both parties on how to improve program administration and
congressional oversight.212
The Congressional Research Service notes “Congress has
substantially amended the IG Act three times since its enactment . . . . The
amendments generally aimed to expand the number of statutory IGs and
199

Id. § 3(b).
Id. § 4(a)(1)–(5).
201
Id. § 4(a)(1).
202
Id. §§ 4(a)(2), 5.
203
Id. § 4(a)(3).
204
Id. § 4(a)(4).
205
Id. § 4(a)(5).
206
Id. § 6(a)(1).
207
Id.
208
See Id. § 6(a)(5) (stating that the Inspector General can have “direct and prompt access”
to agency officials).
209
Id. § 6(a)(6).
210
Id. § 6(a)(7).
211
Id. § 6(a)(9).
212
See FRANCIS, supra note 186, at 1 (explaining that “to execute their missions, IGs lead
offices of inspector general (OIGs) that conduct various reviews of agency programs and
operations—including audits, investigations, inspections, and evaluations—and provide
findings and recommendations to improve them. IGs possess several authorities to carry out
their respective missions, such as the ability to independently hire staff, access relevant
agency records and information, and report findings and recommendations directly to
Congress”).
200
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enhance their independence, transparency, and accountability.”213 These
many amendments reflect the continuing need for Inspectors General
throughout government and the lingering barriers to effective oversight.
In 1988, Congress amended the Act to create additional IGs in the
Department of Justice, Department of Treasury, and the Federal Emergency
Management Administration.214 It also brought IGs who pre-dated the
original Act, such as the Inspector General for the Department of Energy, into
conformity with the Act. 215 Furthermore, it separated the process for
appropriating money to OIGs from the process used for the host agency. 216
In 2008, Congress passed the Inspector General Reform Act in
response to several incidents that revealed issues with IGs’ independence. For
example, Department of State Inspector General Howard Krongard allegedly
interfered with numerous ongoing investigations to protect the State
Department and White House from embarrassment during the George W.
Bush administration.217 The Inspector General Reform Act established the
Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). This is
“an independent entity established within the executive branch to address
integrity, economy and effectiveness issues that transcend individual
Government agencies and aid in the establishment of a professional, welltrained and highly skilled workforce in the Offices of Inspectors General

213

Id. Those amendments were the IGA Amendments of 1988, the IG Reform Act of 2008,
and the IG Empowerment Act of 2016. Pub. L. 100-504; Pub. L. 110-409; Pub. L. 114-317.
214
See generally Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-504, § 102(a),
102 Stat. 2515, 2515 (stating the Amendments and the date they were ratified).
215
FRANCIS, supra note 186, at 3; Pub. L. No. 100-504, § 102(a).
216
FRANCIS, supra note 188, at 34.
217
See “Improving Government Accountability Act,” H. REP. NO.110-354, H. COMM. ON
OVERSIGHT & GOVERNMENT REFORM, 110 Cong. 1st. Session, at 9 (2007) (“According to
current and former employees of the Office of Inspector General, Mr. Krongard's strong
affinity with State Department leadership, support for the current administration, and partisan
political ties have led him to halt investigations, censor reports, and refuse to cooperate with
law enforcement agencies.”). The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
pointed to multiple other instances of Bush Administration inspectors general either abusing
their authority or being pressured by political officials to do so. These incidents were seen
as a sign that IGs themselves needed to be overseen. Thus, the CIGIE was formed to allow
IGs to oversee their own peers. See id. at 9 (enumerating the various other instances of abuse
of authority or political pressure on inspectors general prior to 2007 during the Bush
Administration).
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(OIG).”218 CIGIE coordinates and oversees IGs across federal agencies.219
The Inspector General Reform Act also strengthened IG independence in a
number of ways, including additional budgetary independence.220
On December 16, 2016, perhaps due to concerns related to the
incoming Trump administration, President Barack Obama signed the
Inspector General Empowerment Act into law.221 “Among its provisions, the
IG Empowerment Act confirms that IGs are entitled to full and prompt access
to agency records, thereby eliminating any doubt about whether agencies are
legally authorized to disclose potentially sensitive information to IGs.” 222
This was intended to make it easier for IGs to conduct audits, reviews, and
investigations in an independent manner. Additionally, it directed CIGIE to
resolve jurisdictional disputes between IGs.223 The Act further required IGs
to submit any documents containing recommendations for corrective action
to agency heads and congressional committees.”224 All of these changes were
intended to bolster the independence and efficacy of IGs across the federal
government.
In general, violations of the IGA relate to two distinct situations. First
are situations in which an agency unreasonably refuses to comply with an IG
investigation. Agencies are mandated to make information available to IGs
in a timely fashion and to comply with lawfully issued subpoenas.225 The
Attorney General promulgates regulations governing the enforcement of
these authorities.226 Because of this, it is DOJ, and not individual IG offices,
218
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, OVERSIGHT.GOV,
https://oversight.gov/inspectors-general/council-inspectors-general-integrity-and-efficiency
[perma.cc/QA5P-3W2M] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (“The statutory mandate of the
Integrity Committee (IC) of CIGIE is to receive, review, and refer for investigation
allegations of wrongdoing made against Covered Persons, and to ensure the fair, consistent,
timely, and impartial disposition of allegations that fall within the IC’s statutory mandate.”).
219
See id. (explaining that the CIGIE was established to address integrity, economy, and
effectiveness issues that help oversee the successful functioning of the OIG).; see also
FRANCIS, supra note 186, at 13 (discussing how the OIG is governed and managed).
220
Id. at 14.
221
IG Act History, OVERSIGHT.GOV, https://www.ignet.gov/content/ig-act-history
[perma.cc/RY96-WSVE] (last visited Apr. 12. 2020).
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
FRANCIS, supra note 186, at 3.
225
5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 § 6.
226
See id. § 6I(4) (stating that the Attorney General shall promulgate guidelines to govern
law enforcement powers); see also ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR OFFICES OF
INSPECTORS GENERAL WITH STATUTORY LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (2005), available at https://www.ignet.gov/
sites/default/files/files/agleguidelines.pdf (describing that the Attorney General promulgates
regulations pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978 and its Amendments)
[perma.cc/V8S2-2FK5].
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that actually enforce IGs’ investigative authorities.227 This means that DOJ
may make arrests when an IG identifies a criminal offense, and may initiate
civil action against anyone who defies a lawfully obtained subpoena or
records request.
Second are situations in which an official retaliates against
whistleblowers who notify IGs of ongoing problems. Agencies may not
retaliate against whistleblowers who bring complaints to an inspector
general.228 The IGA does not itself provide a mechanism to enforce
whistleblower protections. However, the Whistleblower Protection Act of
1989 created formal enforcement authorities an inspector general may
exercise in response to an apparent reprisal.229
2. Ethics in Government Act
The Ethics in Government Act, sometimes referred to as the
independent counsel law, is another watchdog statute passed in response to
problems within the Nixon administration. It was intended to eliminate
corruption in the federal government by requiring government officials to
disclose information regarding their financial interests,230 restricting the
ability of government officials to move into regulated industries after leaving
the government,231 and creating an Office of Ethics in the Civil Service
Commission to oversee the administration of the law.232 This was in response
to concerns that too many members of the civil service were leaving
government jobs and entering regulated industries, which created the
appearance of a corrupt administrative state.233
The Act is best known for creating the position of “special counsel,”
later re-identified in 1988 as an “independent counsel,” within the
Department of Justice.234 The independent counsel position served as
227

Id.
5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 § 7. This does not apply to whistleblowers who knew or should have
known that their complaint was premised on false information. Id.
229
Id.
230
CONG. REC. S. 13,329 (May 3, 1977).
231
Id.
232
Id. (“The provisions of the Act would strike a careful balance between the rights of these
individuals to their privacy and the right of the American people to know that their public
officials are free from conflicts of interest.”).
233
See CONG. REC. H30,419 (1978) (“[W]hat this is doing really is preventing an employee
from going back to the agency in which he served in a responsible position with some kind
of business with that same agency.”); see also CONG. REC. S13,329 (1977) (“This approach
will eliminate all appearance of high-level interference in sensitive investigations and
prosecutions. The American people must be assured that no one, regardless of position, is
above the law.”).
234
Levin & Bean, supra note 24, at 14.
228
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independent prosecutor insulated from pressure by the President, whose role
is to investigate allegations of misconduct by high-level political officials.235
The independent counsel was not a standing position, but instead was
temporarily appointed by the Attorney General once certain conditions were
met.236 In this way, the Act provided a framework under which the Attorney
General may decide whether an independent counsel should be appointed,
rather than requiring one be appointed at all times.237
Congress’s goal was “to establish ‘a neutral procedure for resolving
the conflict of interest that arises when the Attorney General must decide
whether to pursue allegations of wrongdoing leveled against . . . [his] close
political associates.’”238 Recognizing damage done by Watergate to the
public’s trust in government, President Carter strongly supported the
independent counsel provisions of the Act, saying they would “eliminate all
appearance of high-level interference in sensitive investigations and
prosecutions. The American people must be assured that no one, regardless
of position, is above the law.”239 In 1989, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute against Article II challenges in Morrison v.
Olson.240
However, in 1999, Congress allowed the independent counsel
provisions of the Act to sunset.241 This was likely because, as the law was
originally designed, the decision of whether to appoint an independent
counsel was left entirely to the Attorney General, and the influence Congress
had to initiate investigations was “very limited.”242
Notably, the law has previously been allowed to expire in the past
only to be resuscitated later, as happened in 1994 when Congress renewed
the law (which had expired in 1992) to appoint Ken Starr to investigate

235

Priester et al., supra note 28, at 8-9.
See id. at 21 (describing the historical development for the conditions required to appoint
an independent counsel).
237
See id. at 30 (stating that the conditions and procedures set forth in the act are designed
to give an Attorney General discretion to screen matters that do not require investigation by
an independent counsel).
238
Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d
1167, 1168 and citing Special Prosecutor Provisions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978:
Hearings Before Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgt. of the Sen. Comm. on Governmental
Affs., 97th Cong. 1-3 (1981) (statement of Sen. Cohen); see also Priester et al., supra note
28, at 8. (“Can the Attorney General and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) be trusted to
investigate and prosecute criminal wrongdoing by the President or persons close to him? The
Act demonstrates that our political leaders have concluded that the answer is ‘no.’”).
239
CONG. REC. S13,329 (1977).
240
487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988).
241
JACK MASKELL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43112, INDEPENDENT COUNSELS, SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS, SPECIAL COUNSELS, AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS 2 (2013).
242
Id. at 3.
236
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Whitewater.243 In 2016, Representative Michael Turner (R–OH) introduced
the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 2016 to reauthorize the
Ethics in Government Act for a five-year period.244 Importantly, the
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act would have expressly authorized
investigations of the President himself. However, the bill was abandoned.245
Because the Ethics in Government Act expired, the Department of
Justice on July 9, 1999 issued replacement regulations for appointing a
special counsel.246 “The regulations set forth a three-part analysis for
determining whether to appoint a special counsel.”247 First, the Attorney
General must determine that “criminal investigation of a person or matter is
warranted.”248 Second, he or she must determine whether investigation or
prosecution of the person or matter by a U.S. Attorney’s Office or a Justice
Department litigating division would present either “a conflict of interest for
the Department” or “other extraordinary circumstances.”249 Finally, the
Attorney General must determine whether “it would be in the public interest
to appoint an outside Special Counsel to assume responsibility for the
matter.”250
One criticism of the regulatory special counsel oversight mechanisms
is that investigations tend to languish and sometimes bore into issues that are
beyond the scope of their original purpose.251 Jurisdictional boundaries of
investigations are supposed to be set by the Attorney General, who may grant
“original” jurisdiction to the special counsel, and who may expand that
jurisdiction.252 Whether jurisdiction will be expanded is therefore based on

243

Id. (“It is possible, in theory, that Congress could reauthorize the independent counsel
law, or provisions of law somewhat similar to the former independent counsel law, to instruct
the Attorney General to seek the appointment of an ‘independent counsel’ under certain
circumstances.”).
244
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act, H.R. 5271, 114th Cong. (2016).
245
See CONG. RSCH. SERV. SUMMARY: H.R. 5271—114TH CONGRESS (2015–2016),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5271?r=2&s=1 [perma.cc/N2WT9LUB] (last visited Nov. 6, 2021) (maintaining a bill tracker that indicates no action has been
taken by Congress since the initial introduction of H.R. 5271).
246
See 28 C.F.R. Part 600.
247
Special Counsel Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com. and Admin. L. of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 55 (1999) (Prepared Testimony of Dick
Thornburgh, Mark H. Tuohey III & Michael Davidson). A reprinting of the testimony is
available at https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/attorney-generals-special-counselregulations/ [perma.cc/26WU-QFPU].
248
28 C.F.R. § 600.1.
249
Id. § 600.1(a).
250
Id. § 600.1(b).
251
Thornburgh et al., supra note 247.
252
28 C.F.R. § 600.4.
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the judgment of DOJ, and not necessarily a political entity. Regardless,
experts from all ends of the political spectrum have criticized the scope of
independent and special counsel investigations, including Democrats’
criticism of the sprawling Whitewater investigation253 and Republicans’
criticism of Robert Mueller’s “Russiagate” inquiry.254
III. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
From the onset of Donald Trump’s presidency in 2017, his
administration pushed the limits of presidential power. With a Republican
majority in the Senate backing them, subordinate officials within his
administration—including Attorney General William Barr, and personal
attorneys Jay Sekulow and Rudy Giuliani—articulated legal arguments
supporting President Trump’s assertions of broad executive authority and
overall immunity from oversight. More than any other president in
contemporary history, Trump articulated a conception of potentially
unlimited presidential power. In the aftermath, Congress must step in to act
again.
A. Ukraine Impoundment Scandal
In advancing his vision of presidential power, President Trump tested
many of the post-Watergate oversight laws. For example, the Impoundment
Control Act was central to Congress’s 2019–2020 impeachment inquiry and
trial. In the summer of 2019, President Trump ordered OMB to impound
money Congress had appropriated to the Department of Defense to Ukraine
as military aid.255 In the special message delivered to Congress, OMB stated
it had withheld the funds “to allow for an interagency process to determine
the best use of such funds.”256

253

See David A. Graham, From Whitewater to Benghazi: A Clinton-Scandal Primer,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/trackingthe-clinton-controversies-from-whitewater-to-benghazi/396182/ [perma.cc/WEV6-Y9RG]
(“The canonical case is Whitewater, a failed real-estate investment Bill and Hillary Clinton
made in 1978. Although no inquiry ever produced evidence of wrongdoing, investigations
ultimately led to President Clinton’s impeachment for perjury and obstruction of justice.”).
254
See Deroy Murdock, Mueller Sticks the Final Shiv in Russiagate, NAT’L REV. (July 26,
2019), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/07/mueller-sticks-the-final-shiv-in-the-russia
gate-hoax/ [perma.cc/J2GP-Z3DX] (“[T]he substance of Mueller’s statements shot holes into
his own report, like Al Capone emptying a machine gun.”).
255
See H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, supra note 157, at 1.
256
Id. at 4.
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The Government Accountability Office determined that Trump’s
action violated the ICA257 because the reason for the impoundment, “to
determine the best use of such funds,” squarely prioritized Trump’s
preferences over those of Congress, and the impoundment was not approved
as a rescission or deferral.258 This was the clearest example since Nixon’s
impoundment of federal water pollution control funds of a president
challenging Congress’s spending power and policy judgment—the exact
thing Congress intended to prevent by passing the ICA.259
In response to the investigations, the House of Representatives
ultimately submitted articles of impeachment to the Senate. However, the
Senate acquitted Trump.260 Additionally, there have been no repercussions
for OMB resulting from the incident.
B. Special Counsel Investigation
Prior to the Ukraine impoundment and impeachment proceedings, the
Trump administration had already faced investigations over alleged
wrongdoings. The most prominent, sometimes referred to as the “Russiagate”
or “Mueller” probe, was an investigation initiated by the Department of
Justice in response to allegations that President Trump’s campaign violated
federal law by collaborating with Russian agents to undermine the integrity
of the 2016 Presidential election. The investigation was led by Robert
Mueller, a special counsel appointed under DOJ regulations. The
investigation revealed lingering weaknesses in the special counsel
mechanism as it currently exists.

257

Olivia Beavers & Rebecca Klar, GAO Finds Trump Administration Broke Law by
Withholding Aid, THE HILL (Jan. 16, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/
478557-gao-finds-trump-administration-broke-law-by-withholding-aid-from [perma.cc/
X2X3-V68Q].
258
See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 158, at 1. (“Faithful execution of the law
does not permit the President to substitute his own policy priorities for those that Congress
has enacted into law. OMB withheld funds for a policy reason, which is not permitted under
the Impoundment Control Act . . . . Therefore, we conclude that OMB violated the ICA.”).
259
In some ways, it is difficult to assess whether Trump’s actions were more egregious than
Nixon’s impoundment of the water pollution control funds. Trump’s actions were clearly
motivated by his political interests (impugning his opponents, in particular his rival for the
presidency, Joe Biden). In contrast, Nixon’s impoundments were largely an effort to enforce
policy preferences in ways that circumnavigated constitutional checks on executive powers.
Thus, while Trump’s decision seems appallingly partisan to many commentators, arguably
it is not as clear an affront to the power of Congress as Nixon’s decision to defy a law passed
over his own veto.
260
Nicholas Fandos, Trump Acquitted of Two Impeachment Charges in Near Party-Line
Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/trumpacquitted-impeachment.html [perma.cc/66CW-NLUS].
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The investigation began in May 2017 and Mueller submitted his final
report to Congress in March 2019.261 Despite no formal charges being
recommended against the President, conservatives were widely upset with
how the investigation was conducted. Echoing critics of prior investigations,
including Ken Starr’s probe into Bill Clinton’s extramarital affair,
Republicans criticized Mueller for wading into issues beyond his original
jurisdiction. Furthermore, based on an expansive theory of Executive power,
a line of critiques has gone so far as to challenge the idea of a special counsel
as unconstitutional. These critics argue “[u]nder the Constitution, it is beyond
the power of Congress to limit or impose conditions on any president’s
authority to remove a political appointee within the Justice Department or
any other department in the executive branch.”262 By this logic, special
counsels may be removed because they are a wholly subordinate officer of
the Executive, and therefore the Legislative branch of government has no
authority to dictate when or for what reason the counsel may be fired.263
This argument came only from Trump’s most ardent supporters, and
as noted previously, it is squarely undermined by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Morrison v. Olson,264 which upheld the Ethics in Government Act
against a separation of powers challenge. A law passed by a coordinate
branch of constitutional government—versus an enforcement arm
answerable to the president—is surely a more legally sound means of
261

ROBERT S. MUELLER III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2019), available at
https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/download [perma.cc/5KUN-ZYPX]
[hereinafter MUELLER REPORT].
262
Hans A. von Spakovsky, Trump has the Constitutional Authority to Fire Mueller—Here’s
Why, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/com
mentary/trump-has-the-constitutional-authority-fire-mueller-heres-why [perma.cc/5KUNZYPX].
263
See id. (“Under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, the president is given the authority
to appoint . . . “Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States.” Congress is also allowed, by law, to “vest
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” . . . All of these officials—with the
exception of judges and certain other officers (for example, the heads of federal agencies
such as the Federal Election Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission)
serve at the pleasure of the president. That means they can be removed by the president for
any reason or no reason. The fact that a Cabinet official may appoint political subordinates—
such as a special counsel—does not take away the authority of the president to remove those
subordinates.”).
264
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659–60 (“This case presents us with a challenge to the
independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C §§ 49,
591 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. V). We hold today that these provisions of the Act do not violate
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, or the limitations of Article
III, nor do they impermissibly interfere with the President’s authority under Article II in
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.”).
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establishing a special counsel apparatus than a policy created by DOJ. There
have been attempts by lawmakers to strengthen, rather than undermine, the
special counsel oversight mechanism—which at present is purely regulatory,
not statutory—but those bills have gone nowhere.
For example, Rep. Michael Turner introduced the Independent
Counsel Reauthorization Act in 2016 to renew the expired provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act related to independent counsels.265 The bill also
would have expressly authorized the investigation of a sitting President.266
Furthermore, in 2017, Republican Senator Thom Tillis introduced the Special
Counsel Integrity Act. 267 Under this bill, only the Attorney General could
discipline or remove a special counsel. The bill further provides that a special
counsel can be removed only for “misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity,
conflict of interest, or other good cause.” The special counsel would have had
to be notified in writing of the “specific reason” for his removal, and the
special counsel would have been given the right to file a lawsuit contesting
removal. However, this bill was abandoned in 2018.
C. Alleged FISA Abuses
The Mueller probe of Russian influence in the 2016 presidential
election was facilitated by FISA, under which the FBI and Robert Mueller
obtained warrants to surveil foreign agents suspected of illegally
collaborating with the Trump campaign. Through FISA warrants, DOJ
investigators uncovered a trove of information regarding improper contacts
between Trump officials and Russian-affiliated agents.268
Indeed, FISA was a central point of tension over the investigation
between Trump administration supporters and opponents even before the
special counsel was appointed. 269 Trump supporters alleged that, prior to the
2016 election, the FBI improperly obtained FISA warrants to spy on
campaign officials, and that the DOJ’s pre-election investigation into
President Trump’s campaign was a politically motivated “hit-job” spurred by
partisans within DOJ.270
265

Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act, H.R. 5271, 114th Cong. (2016).
Id.
267
Special Counsel Integrity Act, S. 1741, 115th Cong. (2017).
268
MUELLER REPORT, supra note 261, at 13, 183.
269
Myths and Facts on Russia Inquiry Origins, CITIZENS FOR RESP. & ETHICS IN WASH.,
https://www.citizensforethics.org/myths-and-facts-russia-inquiry-origins/ [perma.cc/P7225LT6] (last visited Feb. 24, 2021) (“FBI FISA applications on former Trump campaign
advisor Carter Page are evidence of a political conspiracy against the Trump campaign.”).
270
See, e.g., John Malcom, The Facts Currently Known About Nunes Memo, FBI Bias
Accusations, HERITAGE FOUND.: COMMENTARY (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/
crime-and-justice/commentary/the-facts-currently-known-about-nunes-memo-fbi-biasaccusations [perma.cc/KDA5-B9P6].
266
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In early 2018, in response to Republican criticism, the DOJ Inspector
General conducted investigations into DOJ abuse of FISA warrant
applications.271 The Department of Justice allowed the IG “extraordinary” to
the FISA warrant applications filed in relation to the 2016 Russia-Trump
investigation.272 The investigation resulted in the discovery of texts between
two FBI agents273 that indicated they held political views adverse to the
President, and that they appeared to desire to incriminate him through the
investigation.274
The IG did not conclude that any laws or internal policies had been
broken, but did recommend changes to the FBI’s and the DOJ’s data retention
policies to ensure similar issues could be investigated more easily in the
future.275 The relevance of these findings are disputed by partisans on both
sides. According to Senator John Cornyn, “the inspector general detailed a
number of truly disturbing and alarming facts about how this investigation
was conducted, especially when it comes to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, otherwise known as FISA.”276 However, other
commentators have contested that the investigation did not turn up anything
of great substance.277
In response to the tension surrounding the Russia investigation,
Republicans introduced the Inspector General Access Act.278 This Act would
grant the Inspector General of the Department of Justice authority to
investigate DOJ prosecutors when those prosecutors are suspected of
271
165 CONG. REC. 204 (2019) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn) [hereinafter Cornyn]. It
should be noted here that this investigation may have been related to the introduction by four
Republican Senators of the “Inspector General Access Act,” which is discussed in the
“Inspector General Act of 1978” section of this document, infra note 278 and accompanying
text. The Inspector General is currently precluded from investigating allegations of
misconduct by DOJ prosecutors, but not FBI agents. Therefore, the Inspector General’s
inquiry into abuse of FISA warrants was limited solely to FBI agents who were involved.
The Inspector General Access Act would allow prosecutors to be investigated as well.
272
Josh Delk, DOJ Agrees to Allow ‘Extraordinary’ Access to FISA Applications, THE HILL
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/382056-doj-offers-extraordinary-accom
modation-allowing-intel-committee-access-to-fisa [perma.cc/X76B-PL73].
273
The two agents were Peter Strzok and Lisa Page, FBI agents who were involved in the
2016 inquiry into the Trump campaign’s contacts with Russia.
274
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION:
RECOVERY OF TEXT MESSAGES FROM CERTAIN FBI MOBILE DEVICES 8 (2018),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/i-2018-003523.pdf [perma.cc/2UWQ-FL2Y].
275
Id. at 11.
276
Cornyn, supra note 271.
277
Devlin Barrett, Matt Zapotosky, Karoun Demirjian & Ellen Nakashima, FBI was Justified
in Opening Trump Campaign Probe, but Case Plagued by Serious Failures, WASH. POST
(Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/inspector-general-rep
ort-trump-russia-investigation/2019/12/09/d5940d88-184c-11ea-a659-7d69641c6ff7_story.
html [perma.cc/BG28-ZAX9].
278
Inspector General Access Act of 2019, H.R. 202, 116th Cong. (2019).
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wrongdoing.279 Theoretically, this would ensure that DOJ prosecutors face
consequences if they abuse the FISA process to obtain politically motivated
warrants, as Republicans argued was the case with the 2016 investigation. To
date, the legislation has not passed, but Senator Dick Durbin has introduced
a revised 2021 version of the bill that is currently moving through the Senate
Judiciary Committee.280
D. Intimidation of Inspectors General
After his first impeachment trial, President Trump appeared
emboldened to flex his power by flouting other post-Watergate reforms in
increasingly aggressive ways. For example, between April 3 and May 15,
2020, the administration dismissed five Inspectors General in what the
Washington Post declared a “slow-motion Friday night massacre.”281 Those
IGs were: Michael Atkinson, IG for the Intelligence Community; Christi
Grimm, Acting IG for the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS);
Steve Linick, IG for the Department of State; Glenn Fine, Acting IG for the
Department of Defense, and Mitch Behm, Acting IG for the Department of
Transportation.282
Despite the obvious way these firings undermined the independence
of IGs, there is little in the Inspector General Act (IGA) that practically
prevents a politically motivated reprisal. The IGA allows the President to
remove an IG so long as the President appropriately reports the removal to
Congress “not later than 30 days before the removal or transfer.”283
The limits of the President’s removal power have not been clearly
defined, and at least one Obama era case highlights this problem, Walpin v.
Corporation for National & Community Service.284 In 2009, President
Obama fired Gerald Walpin, the Inspector General for the Corporation for

279

Id.
Inspector General Access Act of 2021, S. 426, 117th Cong. (2021).
281
Aaron Blake, Trump’s Slow-Motion Friday Night Massacre of Inspectors General,
WASH. POST, (May 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/16/
trumps-slow-moving-friday-night-massacre-inspectors-general/ [perma.cc/Y69U-Y6D5].
The period was characterized by a pattern of the administration announcing departures on
Friday evenings, prompting accusations that the administration was attempting to hide the
moves from public scrutiny. See id. (“The Friday news dump—also known as the
Friday night news dump—is a political trick with plenty of precedent. Wait till the vast
majority of the news business clocks out for on the week and announce something you’d
rather they not cover as much.”).
282
Id.
283
5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 § 3(b).
284
718 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. June 17, 2018).
280
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National and Community Service (CNCS).285 The reason Obama provided to
Congress for the firing was the President no longer had “the fullest
confidence in” Walpin.286 Walpin sued the Obama administration, claiming
the firing was intended to stifle Walpin’s investigation into former NBA
player and Mayor of Sacramento Kevin Johnson, a high-profile supporter of
Obama.287 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed the suit.288 The court stated that the requirement in the statute that
the President give Congress his reasons for removal was too vague for the
courts to assess whether Obama’s claim that he had lost confidence in Walpin
was sufficient to support the removal.289
Furthermore, like an independent counsel under the Ethics in
Government Act, IGs are officers within the Executive branch, and therefore
the ability of Congress to enforce IG independence measures is somewhat
limited. Though the precise extent to which Congress can impose “for-cause
removal protections” is not yet clear, two cases—Morrison v. Olson290 and
Seila Law v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau291—provide some
guidance. Both explore the constitutional limits on Congress’s authority to
provide for-cause removal protections to insulate agency officials from
executive pressure. As explained above, Morrison affirmed the
constitutionality of the statutory independent counsel mechanism with
respect to appointment,292 concluding that the Attorney General can be vested
with exclusive authority to appoint an independent counsel. That case was
refined by Seila Law, which challenged the constitutionality of the removal
protections provided to the director of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB)—an independent official protected by for-cause removal in
285

See id. at 19–20 (explaining that President Obama’s special counsel requested Walpin’s
resignation and had him placed on administrative leave before informing both Houses of
Congress that he was “exercising [his] power as President to remove [Mr. Walpin] from
office . . .”).
286
Id. at 20.
287
Josh Gerstein, Former Watchdog Walpin Loses Suit Over Firing, POLITICO (June 18,
2010), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2010/06/former-watchdog-walpinloses-suit-over-firing-027625 [perma.cc/FPE9-E636].
288
Walpin, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
289
See id. at 22–24 (“While Walpin complains that the President’s rationale was insufficient,
Walpin fails to show how the IGRA provides any sort of criteria that would allow a court to
make that determination.”).
290
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 663 (1998).
291
Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191–92 (2020).
292
487 U.S. at 675–76 (“We do not mean to say that Congress’ power to provide for
interbranch appointments of ‘inferior officers’ is unlimited . . . . In this case, however, we do
not think it impermissible for Congress to vest the power to appoint independent counsel in
a specially created federal court. We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion
that there is an inherent incongruity about a court having the power to appoint prosecutorial
officers.”).
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a way similar to independent counsels.293 The Supreme Court held that the
for-cause removal protections ascribed to the CFPB director were
unconstitutional because the act vested an official other than the President
with authority to execute the laws of Congress, and in doing so stole power
assigned by the Constitution to the Executive.294
The constitutionality of inspectors general per se has not reached the
U.S. Supreme Court. In light of Morrison, however, the current law suggests
that some limits on the President’s ability to fire an IG are legal, particularly
given the inclusion of statutory language and evidence of legislative intent
indicating a desire by Congress to create an office independent from the
Executive. The IGA says: “Neither the head of the establishment nor the
officer next in rank below such head shall prevent or prohibit the Inspector
General from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or
investigation, or from issuing any subpoena during the course of any audit or
investigation.”295
What follows is a discussion of each of the firings that took place
under President Trump from April 3rd to May 15th, 2020.
1. Inspector General of National Intelligence
The afternoon of Friday, April 3, 2020, President Trump fired
Michael Atkinson, the IG of the Intelligence Community.296 In his message
to Congress, he claimed he had lost confidence in Atkinson,297 in language
that was similar to that used by President Obama when he dismissed the IG
293

140 S. Ct. at 2191–92.
Id. at 2192 (“We therefore hold that the structure of the CFPB violates the separation of
powers. We go on to hold that the CFPB Director's removal protection is severable from the
other statutory provisions bearing on the CFPB's authority. The agency may therefore
continue to operate, but its Director, in light of our decision, must be removable by the
President at will.”). Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 492–95 (2010) (leaving in place two exceptions to the President's unrestricted removal
power representing the outermost constitutional limits of permissible congressional
restriction on the removal power: (1) multimember expert agencies that do not
wield substantial executive power and (2) inferior officers with limited duties and no
policymaking or administrative authority).
295
5 U.S.C. Appx. 3 § 3(a).
296
Natasha Bertrand & Andrew Desiderio, Trump Fires Intelligence Community Watchdog
Who Defied Him on Whistleblower Complaint, POLITICO (Apr. 4, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/03/trump-fires-intelligence-community-inspectorgeneral-164287 [perma.cc/ZHH4-UA5F].
297
Letter from President Donald Trump to Richard Burr, Chairman, S. Select Comm. on
Intelligence, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 3, 2020) (“As is the case with regard to other positions
where I, the President, have the power of appointment, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, it is vital that I have the fullest confidence in the appointees serving as
Inspectors General. That is no longer the case with regard to [Michael Atkinson].”).
294
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of CNCS. However, Trump publicly disclosed that Atkinson was fired
because he investigated a whistleblower complaint.298 The complaint alleged
the President had improperly impounded Department of Defense foreign
military aid to Ukraine, and conditioned release on Ukraine’s announcement
of a corruption investigation into the President’s political rival, Joe Biden.299
Following his firing, Atkinson released a defiant statement urging his
fellow IGs throughout the federal government to continue to fulfill their
oversight duties and encouraging whistleblowers to continue to report
wrongdoing.300 As Atkinson noted in his statement, his firing is likely to have
a chilling effect on inspectors general throughout the federal system.
The firing of Atkinson probably cannot be classified as a prohibition
against the investigation he carried out. Instead, it was a retaliation for his
decision to initiate the investigation. This retaliatory measure did not prevent
Atkinson’s investigation, but it did send a chilling message to IGs at other
agencies. That message: Do not initiate investigations that will embarrass the
administration.301 This incident made clear that protections of independence
298

Andrew Desiderio, Trump Defends Firing ‘Terrible’ Intel Community Watchdog as
Republicans Question Sacking, POLITICO (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/
2020/04/04/chuck-grassley-intel-community-watchdog-firing-164831 [perma.cc/Z48DSC82]
299
Jonathan Landay, “Republicans Want Hunter Biden, Whistleblower to Testify in Open
Hearings,” REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-impeach
ment/republicans-want-hunter-biden-whistleblower-to-testify-in-open-hearings-idUSKBN
1XJ0FK [perma.cc/5RZK-NVX7].
300
See Statement of Michael K. Atkinson, Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,
on His Removal from Office (Apr. 5, 2020), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/document
helper/6865-atkinson-statement-on-removal/339e56bc31e7c607c4b9/optimized/full.pdf
#page=1 [perma.cc/FSG6-C8VR] (“Finally, a message for any government employee or
contractor who believes they have learned of or observed unethical, wasteful, or illegal
behavior in the federal government. The American people deserve an honest and effective
government. They are counting on you to use authorized channels to bravely speak up . . . I
have faith that my colleagues in Inspectors General Offices throughout the federal
government will continue to operate effective and independent whistleblower programs, and
that they will continue to do everything in their power to protect the rights of whistleblowers.
Please do not allow recent events to silence your voices.”)
301
In the wake of Atkinson’s firing, the President practically declared open season on
Inspectors General who carry out their statutory duties. See Trump Attacks W.H.O. and Ousts
Watchdog for Pandemic Fund, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/07/world/coronavirus-updates-news-live.html [perma.cc/XGQ9-4SSK] (discussing
Trump’s public rebukes of various Inspectors General throughout the government); Brianna
Ehley & Alice Miranda Ollstein, Trump Blasts HHS Watchdog for Report on Hospital
Shortages, POLITICO (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/06/withworst-to-come-3-in-4-us-hospitals-now-facing-covid-19-167853 [perma.cc/JP6W-Y65R]
(“President Donald Trump on Monday blasted his health department's watchdog for a new
report revealing supply shortages and testing delays at hospitals responding to the
coronavirus crisis, claiming the findings were inaccurate and politically motivated.”);
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pre-investigation are not sufficient to allow IGs to do their job and additional
protections are needed to ensure that IGs can carry out their missions without
fear of reprisal.
An additional weakness in the Act is the inability of the IG of the
Department of Justice to investigate misconduct by DOJ attorneys, which
prevented the IG from initiating an investigation into alleged abuse of the
FISA system in 2016.302 This prohibition led to the introduction of H.R. 202,
the Inspector General Access Act of 2019, discussed briefly in section C,
supra.303 This bill would “transfer[] responsibility for investigating certain
allegations of misconduct from the [DOJ] Office of Professional
Responsibility to the DOJ Office of the Inspector General. Specifically, the
bill transfers responsibility for allegations relating to a DOJ attorney’s
authority to investigate, litigate, or provide legal advice.”304 The bill was
introduced by Senator Mike Lee.305 According to Lee, “The Inspector
General Access Act solves the problems that have long plagued oversight of

Stephen M. Kohn, How Firing Inspector General Atkinson Impacts the Government’s Ability
to Fight Coronavirus, THE HILL (Apr. 6, 2020), https://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/politics/491284-how-the-firing-inspector-general-atkinson-impacts-the
[perma.cc/69QK-QD9Y] (discussing the pressure put on the Navy’s IG not to open an
investigation into firings of sailors who raise concerns regarding COVID-19 aboard their
ships).
302
See Allie Gottlieb, Current Law Helps Shield Attorney General From Independent
Review, REG. REV. (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/03/03/gottliebcurrent-law-helps-shield-attorney-general-independent-review/
[perma.cc/3HRY-2JD7]
(summarizing the law that requires the DOJ IG to defer to the Attorney General’s Office of
Professional Responsibility on all investigations of DOJ attorney misconduct).
303
Inspector General Access Act of 2019, supra note 278.
304
See CONG. RSCH. SERV. SUMMARY: H.R. 202—116TH CONGRESS (2019–2020),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/202/summary/ [perma.cc/2MDG37SF].
305
The bill was introduced by four Republican Senators. Id. However, it also received
support from traditionally liberal groups, such as the ACLU. See Letter from ACLU to Sens.
Mike Lee, Marsha Blackburn, Charles Grassley, Lisa Murkowski & Marco Rubio, ACLU
(Oct. 16, 2019), available at https://www.aclu.org/letter/coalition-letter-ig-access-act
[perma.cc/3LUZ-9YDP] [hereinafter ACLU Letter] (“The Inspector General Access Act is
commonsense legislation that would make a simple yet vital revision to the Inspector General
Act of 1978 that we believe will enhance the accountability of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) by allowing the DOJ inspector general to investigate allegations of misconduct by
federal attorneys. . . . Under current policy and practice, alleged professional wrongdoing or
other issues relating to professional misconduct by DOJ attorneys are handled by an internal
and non-independent entity, the Office of Professional Responsibility.”).
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DOJ lawyers by simply striking the jurisdictional carve out in § 8E of the
Inspector General Act.”306 This would remove barriers preventing DOJ’s IG
from investigating allegations of misconduct against DOJ attorneys. 307
Given former Attorney General William Barr’s attempts to politicize
the DOJ, the Inspector General Access Act would arguably create a necessary
safeguard to protect the integrity of the institution.308 It would make it
possible to determine whether investigations initiated by a presidential
administration are being carried out for proper purposes, such as to prevent
corruption, and not merely to smear political opponents. The bill received
support from politicians and advocacy groups across the political spectrum.
For example, a coalition of civil liberties groups, including the ACLU,
expressed support for the bill in a letter to Senator Lee, a Republican.309
According to an ACLU press release, the organization’s support is grounded
in concerns over transparency.310 The legislation was intended to promote
accountability, transparency, and integrity in the Department of Justice by
allowing the Inspector General to exercise jurisdiction over attorneys just as
would be exercised over other DOJ employees.311
2. Principal Deputy Inspector General of Health & Human Services
On May 2, 2020, Trump replaced Acting IG Christi Grimm at the
Department of Health & Human Services.312 This was in response to
Grimm’s report that hospitals were experiencing “severe shortages” in
306

Press Release, Sen. Mike Lee, Sens. Lee, Grassley, Murkowski, Blackburn, and Rubio
Introduce Inspector General Access Act, (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/2019/3/sens-lee-grassley-murkowski-blackburn-and-rubio-introduce-inspectorgeneral-access-act. [perma.cc/8WL6-3LVP].
307
See id. (“[T]he Department of Justice OIG currently does not have the power to review
the conduct of DOJ attorneys, an oversight which this legislation corrects.”).
308
Barr’s efforts to use the massive investigatory apparatus of the Justice Department to cast
suspicion on political opponents was well documented. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett, Matt
Zapotosky & Josh Dawsey, Barr’s Internal Reviews and Re-Investigations Feed Resentment,
Suspicion Inside Justice Dept., WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2020) (“The Justice Department in the
Trump era has repeatedly tasked U.S. attorneys from far-flung offices to parachute into
politically explosive cases in Washington, raising concerns among current and former
officials that agency leaders are trying to please the president by reviewing and
reinvestigating cases in which he is personally or politically invested.”).
309
ACLU Letter, supra note 305.
310
Id.
311
Id.
312
Id.; Lisa Rein, Trump Replaces HHS Watchdog Who Found ‘Severe Shortages’ at
Hospitals Combating Coronavirus, WASH. POST (May 2, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/trump-replaces-hhs-watchdog-who-found-severe-shortages-at-hospitalscombating-coronavirus/2020/05/02/6e274372-8c87-11ea-ac8a-fe9b8088e101_story.html
[perma.cc/Q3VF-V9SM].
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critical resources such as personal protective equipment (PPE) and intensive
care unit (ICU) capacity because of COVID-19.313 This firing was especially
concerning given the vast scope of the public health and economic responses
triggered by the pandemic, which has already involved trillions in federal
response funding, all of which needs to be overseen by a financial watchdog.
In response to the pandemic, Congress passed the CARES Act, a $2 trillion
economic relief bill.314 The Act contains three mechanisms for oversight
regarding how the money is spent.315 First, it created the Pandemic Response
Accountability Committee, a panel of IGs tasked with general oversight of
the law’s administration.316 Second, it created the Special Inspector General
for Pandemic Recovery, who is assigned to oversee the Treasury
Department’s distribution of money for large corporations.317 Finally, it
created a bi-partisan, bicameral Congressional Oversight Commission to
oversee the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve.318
The timing of the enactment of the CARES Act coincided with
Trump’s campaign of intimidation against federal IGs. To this day, the need
for effective oversight of CARES Act funding remains urgent, as indicated
by the findings of a House panel that HHS overpaid for ventilators by as much
as $500 million.319 The same deal allowed the contractor to delay production
of the ventilators until September 2022, despite a present need for them.320
Furthermore, IGs across the federal government felt intimidated under
Trump. If the precedent lingers that IGs may be unable to do their jobs
without fear of retaliation, the oversight provisions in the CARES Act are
313

CHRISTI A. GRIMM, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., OEI06-20-00300, HOSPITAL EXPERIENCES RESPONDING TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: RESULTS
OF A NATIONAL PULSE SURVEY MARCH 23-27, 2020, at 1 (2020), available at
https://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-20-00300.pdf [perma.cc/X28Z-52Y3]; Rein,
supra note 312.
314
See Jackson Gode, Congressional Oversight of the CARES Act Could Prove
Troublesome, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/
2020/04/15/congressional-oversight-of-the-cares-act-could-prove-troublesome/
[perma.cc/F5KZ-3P3G] (“President Trump signed the CARES Act providing for more than
$2 Trillion in federal spending in response to the COVID-19 crisis.”).
315
Id.
316
Id. The panel is composed of a minimum of nine IGs. Currently, the panel is comprised
of 22 IGs. PANDEMIC RESPONSE ACCOUNTABILITY COMM., About the PRAC,
https://www.pandemicoversight.gov/our-mission/about-the-prac [perma.cc/XU8M-DZC3]
(last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
317
Gode, supra note 314.
318
Id.
319
Patricia Callahan & Sebastian Rotella, The White House Paid Up to $500 Million Too
Much for These Ventilators, Congressional Investigators Say, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 7, 2020),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-white-house-paid-up-to-500-million-too-much-forthese-ventilators-congressional-investigators-say [perma.cc/3K2F-YL9T].
320
Id.
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rendered pointless. Grimm highlighted these very concerns upon her ousting,
stating “I cannot let the idea of providing unpopular information drive
decision-making in the work we do.”321 Like Atkinson, she stressed that
independence is “the cornerstone of what any office of inspector general
does.”322
3. Inspectors General of the State Department
Under President Trump, the Inspector General for the State
Department was replaced twice. First, Steve Linick was replaced as a part of
the “slow-moving Saturday Night Massacre.”323 Second, his replacement, a
political appointee named Stephen Akard, resigned for undisclosed
reasons.324 Though the reason for Akard’s resignation was unclear, the
circumstances around his appointment were controversial.325 Akard replaced
Linick in response to pressure on President Trump from Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo, whom Linick was investigating for his involvement in a 2019
arms sale to Saudi Arabia that was completed without Congressional
approval.326
Despite this tumult, the State Department’s OIG was busy. In August
2020, it published a report titled “Review of the Department of State’s Role
in Arms Transfers to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
321

Amy Goldstein, Top HHS Watchdog Being Replaced by Trump Says Inspectors General
Must Work Free From Political Intrusion, WASH. POST (May 26, 2020), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/health/top-hhs-watchdog-being-replaced-by-trump-says-inspectors-general
-must-work-free-from-political-intrusion/2020/05/26/5c83f41a-9f49-11ea-9590-1858a893b
d59_story.html [perma.cc/8TFP-V57A].
322
Id.
323
Aaron Blake, Trump’s Slow-Motion Friday Night Massacre of Inspectors General,
WASH. POST, (May 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/16/
trumps-slow-moving-friday-night-massacre-inspectors-general/ [perma.cc/Y69U-Y6D5];
see also Michele Kelemen, Trump Removes State Department Inspector General Steve
Linkick, NPR (May 16, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/16/857334790/presidenttrump-removes-state-department-inspector-general-steve-linick [perma.cc/Y7XW-5CDX]
(“President Trump is ousting State Department Inspector General Steve Linick, extending a
string of administration firings of government watchdogs.”); Pranshu Verma & Edward
Wong, Another Inspector General Resigns Amid Questions About Pompeo, N. Y. TIMES
(Aug. 25, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/05/us/politics/inspector-generalpompeo-state.html [perma.cc/QG8B-NZF3] (explaining that Stephen Akard, who replaced
Steve Linick, resigned less than three months after his predecessor’s firing, and the
resignation came as Congress continued to inquire about the reasons for Linick’s firing).
324
See Matt Perez, Acting State Department Inspector General Resigns After Less Than
Three Months, FORBES (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattperez/2020/08/05/
acting-state-department-inspector-general-resigns-after-less-than-threemonths/?sh=57547c3e3f89 [perma.cc/4VLL-ZMYN].
325
Id.
326
Id.
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Emirates.”327 The report indicated that the Trump administration failed to
adequately consider the humanitarian impact arms sales to Saudi Arabia
would have in Yemen.328 In light of these concerning allegations, it remains
important that stability and effective oversight in the State OIG are achieved.
4. Acting Inspector General of the Department of Defense
On April 7, 2020, President Trump replaced Glenn Fine, the Acting
IG for the Department of Defense, just as he prepared to step into a new role
as the chairman of the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee created
under the CARES Act.329 While Trump never announced a retaliatory motive
for replacing Fine, the New York Times reported that it may have been in
response to the President’s perception that Fine was a “partisan foe.”330 This
is most troubling because replacing Fine prevented Fine, a figure widely
viewed as apolitical, from taking on a role overseeing the disbursement of the
$2.2 trillion in pandemic relief money.331 Furthermore, Fine was replaced by
327

OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ISP-I-20-19, REVIEW OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S ROLE IN ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (2020), available at https://www.stateoig.gov/system/
files/isp-i-20-19.pdf [perma.cc/975Q-HFVK].
328
Diane Bernabei & Beth Van Schaack, State Dept. Inspector General Report: A Troubling
Message on Arms Sales, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/
72188/state-dept-inspector-general-linick-saudi-arms-sales/ [perma.cc/Q5HE-2X5Z].
329
Charlie Savage & Peter Baker, Trump Ousts Pandemic Spending Watchdog Known for
Independence, N.Y. TIMES (April 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/pol
itics/trump-coronavirus-watchdog-glenn-fine.html [perma.cc/E88E-NX3T] (“President
Trump moved on Tuesday to oust the leader of a new watchdog panel charged with
overseeing how his administration spends trillions of taxpayer dollars in
coronavirus pandemic relief, the latest step in an abruptly unfolding White House power play
against semi-independent inspectors general across the government. The official, Glenn A.
Fine, has been the acting inspector general for the Defense Department since before
Mr. Trump took office and was set to become the chairman of a new Pandemic Response
Accountability Committee to police how the government carries out the $2.2 trillion
coronavirus relief bill. But Mr. Trump replaced Mr. Fine in his Pentagon job, disqualifying
him from serving on the new oversight panel.”).
330
Id. (“At his daily coronavirus briefing, Mr. Trump offered no particular explanation for
sidelining Mr. Fine but characterized it as part of a larger shuffle of inspectors general, some
of them left over from past administrations, and cited unspecified ‘reports of bias.’ . . . But
Mr. Trump’s allies said he felt burned by the investigations of his campaign and associates
and therefore distrusts figures he perceives to be partisan foes within government . . . .”).
331
Id. (“In removing Mr. Fine from his role overseeing pandemic spending, Mr. Trump
targeted a former Justice Department inspector general who earned a reputation for
aggressive independence in scrutinizing the F.B.I.’s use of surveillance and other law
enforcement powers in the years after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks . . . . A group of inspectors
general led by Michael E. Horowitz, the Justice Department inspector general, will determine
who will replace Mr. Fine as chairman of the new pandemic oversight committee. Created
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the IG for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), who was not relieved
of his duties at EPA.332 Trump thus split his nominee between the two
agencies—ensuring lax oversight at both.333
5. Acting Inspector General of the Department of Transportation
Finally, Trump demoted the former Acting IG for the Department of
Transportation, Mitch Behm, to deputy after a long vacancy,334 using the
Vacancies Act to install a political appointee at the post instead.335 This
replacement was notable for several reasons. First, it was another example of
Trump removing an official who would oversee implementation of money
distributed by the CARES Act. Second, the nomination was done in such a
way that executive authority under the Vacancies Act may have been
expanded.
President Trump repeatedly used the Vacancies Act to replace career
bureaucrats with political appointees across the federal government,
including IGs.336 The Vacancies Act allows a President to appoint an acting
official to temporarily fill a vacancy that would otherwise be filled by a
Senate confirmed official.337 Normally, this appointment must occur within

as part of the coronavirus relief bill, the committee consists of nine inspectors general from
across the executive branch and will have an $80 million budget to hunt for waste, fraud,
abuse and illegality in the disbursement of the $2.2 trillion approved by Congress to provide
relief to Americans affected by the pandemic.”).
332
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Watchdogs at Large, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 6, 2020), https://
www.brookings.edu/research/watchdogs-at-large/ [perma.cc/P6SE-HRB4] (“Only when the
White House nominated Jason Abend to the position in early April could President Trump
demote Fine. Abend’s nomination allowed the Vacancies Act to kick in again, which
permitted the President to select Sean O’Donnell, the EPA’s confirmed IG, as the new acting
IG for the Department of Defense. (Under the quirks of the Vacancies Act, O’Donnell
maintains his official title and responsibilities as the EPA’s IG as well. Although he can
delegate work to others, he is now stretched very thin.”).
333
Id.
334
Sam Mintz, Democrats Blast Removal of Acting DOT Inspector General, POLITICO
(May 19, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/19/democrats-blast-removal-ofacting-dot-inspector-general-268611 [perma.cc/5JY6-BK45] (“Behm, a longtime deputy
inspector general who had been acting in the lead position since Calvin Scovell retired in
January, was replaced Saturday by Skip Elliott, who is also administrator of the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.”).
335
O’Connell, supra note 332 (“Like Akard, the new acting IG at Transportation is a political
appointee.”).
336
See id. (noting Trump’s use of the Vacancies Act to appoint Sean O’Donnell as Acting
IG of the Department of Defense, Stephen Akard as Acting IG of the State Department, and
Stephen Elliot as Acting IG of the Department of Transportation).
337
VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE VACANCIES ACT: A LEGAL OVERVIEW
3 (2020).
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a set timeframe of 210 days.338 However, Trump appointed his replacement
Acting IG for Transportation after that time limit had already expired.339 In
doing so, Trump may have effectively expanded the timeframe further as a
matter of precedent, thus allowing him more time in the future to delay
selecting a temporary appointment, and providing additional opportunities to
thwart potentially harmful internal investigations.340
6. Inspector General of the Post Office
One key agency involved in the 2020 election was the United States
Postal Service (USPS), which received public scrutiny because of reported
changes by the Trump administration. As allegations of politically motivated
reforms emerged, it became increasingly vital that the IG ensure
accountability and foster public trust in the USPS. Indeed, the IG of USPS
announced in August 2020 that the office was opening an investigation into
policy changes imposed under Postmaster General Louis DeJoy.341 This
investigation was in response to a request from Congress.342 The
investigation followed the resignation of two members of USPS’s Board of
Governors over similar allegations of politicization of the agency.343
E. Weaknesses in Federal Advisory Committee Act
1. Open questions about the Trump White House’s Coronavirus
Task Force
The COVID-19 pandemic added urgency for Executive branch
oversight in several additional ways. As discussed above, the need for a
strong IG at HHS to oversee the distribution of CARES Act money became
important, as well as the need to ensure other federal bodies overseeing the
response to the pandemic are also accountable. In response to the pandemic,
338

Id. at 13.
O’Connell, supra note 332.
340
See id. (“The President did not need to nominate someone to change the acting IG at the
Transportation Department because the vacancy still fell within the Act’s time limits.
President Trump extended those limits, however, when he did submit a nominee a month
later.”).
341
Marshall Cohen & Kristen Holmes, Exclusive: Postal Service Inspector General
Reviewing DeJoy’s Policy Changes and Potential Ethics Conflicts, CNN (Aug. 15, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/14/politics/postal-service-inspector-general-reviewingdejoy/index.html [perma.cc/GJA6-U2BJ].
342
Id.
343
Alana Abramson, How the Postal Service Became Donald Trump’s for the Taking, TIME
(Aug. 20, 2020), https://time.com/5882006/usps-board-governors-trump/ [perma.cc/Z7U6RTBV].
339
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President Trump put his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, in charge of a “shadow”
task force composed of federal officials and industry representatives. The
goal of the task force was to help federal agencies address the nation’s acute
shortage of tests to determine whether patients are infected with COVID-19.
Ethics watchdogs sounded the alarm that the task force may have
actually been a rogue advisory committee in violation of FACA.344 In a letter
to the White House by Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington
(CREW), the group stated, “Mr. Kushner’s use of a committee composed of
federal employees and non-governmental members to solicit advice on how
the White House should address the coronavirus pandemic implicates the
FACA.” 345 According to CREW, the committee’s use of a private email
server likely violated both FACA and the Presidential Records Act.346 CREW
also expressed concern that the committee’s secret meetings violated
FACA.347 Without access to meetings or emails, the public remains in the
dark. These concerns should have raised congressional alarms, especially
because President Trump and Jared Kushner stood to potentially benefit
personally from the passage of stimulus bills related to COVID-19.348 If
Trump, Kushner, and their associates were profiting off policies related to the
crisis, it is likely that related FACA violations resulted in the very sort of
corruption the Act was intended to prevent. However, given weaknesses in
the enforceability of FACA that were outlined by the D.C. Circuit during the
Bush administration, it is difficult to see what the practical consequences for
such violations would be.

344

See e.g., Press Release, Kushner’s Shadow Task Force Appears to Violate Multiple Laws,
CITIZENS FOR RESP. AND ETHICS IN WASH. (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.citizensforethics.
org/press-release/kushners-shadow-task-force-violate-multiple-laws/
[perma.cc/G6BS8NGV] (noting Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington letter raising alarms
that Kushner’s task force violated the PRA and FACA).
345
Letter from Noah Bookbinder, Executive Director, Citizens for Resp. and Ethics in Wash.
to Pat Cipollone, White House Counsel (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.citizensforethics.org/
wp-content/uploads/legacy/2020/03/2020-3-27-WH-Counsel-letter-PRA-FACA.pdf
[perma.cc/B78W-B96J].
346
CITIZENS FOR RESP. AND ETHICS IN WASH., supra note 344.
347
Id.
348
Jonathan Lemire & Stephen Braun, Virus Relief Package Could Help Trump, Kushner
Businesses, AP (Mar. 26, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-donald-trumppolitics-windfalls-business-cfd3e3fe42997a7f3dbcc5c9225a4851 [https://perma.cc/4PPG3GZH] (“The $2 trillion legislative package moving through Congress to shore up the U.S.
economy devastated by the coronavirus was carefully written to prevent President Donald
Trump and his family from profiting from the federal fund. But the fine print reveals that
businesses owned by Trump and his family still may be eligible for some assistance.”).

88

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[December 2021

2. NDRC’s FACA objection to Cheney Energy Task Force
The George W. Bush administration pushed the limits of FACA,
prompting the D.C. Circuit to clarify the scope of its enforceability.349 In
2004, environmental and public interest groups sued the federal government
under FACA and FOIA to obtain records related to an “energy task force” at
the Department of the Interior, led by Vice President Cheney.350 The lawsuit
was prompted by the agency’s failure to make public committee notes,
correspondences between committee members and government employees,
and conversations committee members had with private outside parties.351
Importantly, NRDC alleged that representatives of energy industry groups
improperly presented information to the task force.352
Despite seeming not to comply with FACA’s basic requirements, the
task force did not face formal sanctions of any sort.353 Instead, the D.C.
Circuit held that although the spirit of FACA may have indeed been violated,
it was beyond the authority of the judiciary to compel the information to be
provided.354 This is because it is the role of the Executive, not the judiciary,
to determine whether a private party is made part of an advisory committee
by virtue of presenting information to it.355 In this instance, the Bush
administration declared the private party was not a part of the task force, and
therefore was exempt from FACAs requirements.356
This decision raised an important weakness in FACA’s efficacy. If a
court is unable to enforce FACA unless the Executive declares an advisory
committee or individual members as subject to FACA, the Executive
essentially has full authority to disregard the statute entirely. Thus, FACA
349

No Openness Required for Cheney Energy Task Force, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM
PRESS (May 12, 2005), https://www.rcfp.org/no-openness-required-cheney-energytask-force/ [perma.cc/76T9-QAWJ].
350
In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 2005); See also Press Release, U.S. Supreme Court
to Hear Cheney Energy Case, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL (Apr. 23, 2004),
https://www.nrdc.org/media/2004/040423 [perma.cc/G2YV-B4WF] (“The fundamental
issue before the U.S. Supreme Court in the FACA lawsuit against Vice President Cheney
and others is whether the public should have access through discovery to records of the
energy task force to determine whether FACA was violated. Neither the district court nor the
D.C. Circuit determined that the administration had violated FACA, but both held that the
plaintiffs had the right to access the information that could prove such violations.”).
351
See Letter from Sharon Buccino & Johanna Wald, Senior Att’ys, Nat. Resources Def.
Council, to William Wolf, FOIA Appeals Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Interior (Apr. 11, 2002),
(https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/taskforce-0411doi.pdf) [perma.cc/2XHD-8ZP9]
(detailing the Agency’s failure to comply with FOIA requests).
352
Id.
353
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 349.
354
Id.
355
Id.
356
Id.; In re Cheney, 406 F.3d at 728.
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must be broadened to include not only members of a committee, but also
individuals who present information or provide advice to that committee.
Doing so would remove the loophole identified by the D.C. Circuit in 2004
by ensuring that, regardless of whether the Executive identifies particular
individuals as “members” of a task force, they will be subject to FACA
requirements simply by virtue of participating in a task force’s meetings.
F. Campaign Finance Violations
1. Dismantling the FEC
Even before his first impeachment acquittal and the COVID
pandemic, Trump had tested the boundaries of the post-Watergate oversight
reforms in a number of ways. For example, early in his administration he
effectively undermined the powers of the FEC by refusing to appoint a
sufficient number of commissioners to enable the agency to take virtually any
actions whatsoever.357 The Commission requires four presidentially
appointed commissioners for a quorum, which is required to approve the
opening of investigations.358 As long as a president does not appoint anyone
else to the Commission, it is unable to investigate campaign finance
violations. In the Trump era, this was particularly troubling because Trump
appears to have potentially committed multiple campaign finance violations
and facilitated widespread lies and disinformation about the legitimacy of Joe
Biden’s win in November 2020.
2. Possible FECA violations
First, in the runup to the 2016 election, Trump received assistance
from Russia-based hackers and Wikileaks in connection to his election when
those foreign nationals hacked into Democratic National Committee servers
and publicly dumped thousands of embarrassing emails regarding thenpresidential candidate Hillary Clinton. If Trump’s campaign coordinated with
those foreign nationals, their involvement could constitute an in-kind
contribution from a foreign national. FECA and FEC regulations include a
broad prohibition on foreign national activity in connection with elections in
357
See Dave Levinthal, Prepare to be Shocked! Trump’s One Weird Trick to Avoid a
Campaign Investigation, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 13, 2020), https://publicintegrity.
org/politics/trump-fec-campaign-election-quorum-pascrell/
[perma.cc/5Z2V-AA5U]
(“[T]he FEC didn’t have enough commissioners to take meaningful action. Republican Vice
Chairman Matthew Petersen had resigned on Sept. 1, causing the 309-employee agency to
slip below a minimum quorum of four commissioners needed to conduct high-level business,
including approving investigations and penalizing scofflaws.”).
358
Id.
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the United States.359 In general, foreign nationals are prohibited from
“making any contribution . . . in connection with any federal . . . election in
the United States.”360 FEC regulations define a “contribution” broadly,
including “anything of value made . . . for the purpose of influencing any
election for Federal office.”361 A “foreign national” includes foreign
governments, foreign citizens, foreign corporations, associations, or
partnerships, or any other “foreign principal” as defined at 22 U.S.C. §
611(b).362 The leaking of embarrassing opposing campaign emails arguably
fell within the FEC’s broad definition of a “contribution.”363 Further, both
Wikileaks and the hackers involved in the leaks were foreign nationals.364
Therefore, if the Trump campaign was aware of the leaking operation, it
likely violated FECA.
Like his 2016 campaign, President Trump’s 2020 presidential
campaign seemed prepared to commit additional campaign finance
violations. For example, both the President and his family members appear
to have profited off his re-election campaign.365 According to filings with the
FEC, Trump’s 2020 campaign spent a considerable amount of money on

359

See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a) (prohibiting contributions or attempts at electioneering from
foreign nationals to political committees, parties, or in connection with an election); See
generally 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 (same).
360
Foreign Nationals, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (June 23, 2017), https://www.fec.gov/
updates/foreign-nationals/ [perma.cc/DY8J-AQKX].
361
Id. §§ 100.52(a), 100.54.
362
Foreign Nationals, supra note 360.
363
FEC Chairwoman Ellen Weintraub was among the most high-profile and authoritative
experts to express this opinion. See Caroline Linton, FEC Chairwoman Tweets “It Is Illegal”
to Accept Anything of Value From a Foreign National in U.S. Election, CBS NEWS (June 13,
2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fec-chairwoman-tweets-illegal-to-accept-anythingof-value-from-foreign-national-in-us-election-2019-06-13/
[perma.cc/WY4A-P3DD]
(noting tweet from Weintraub clarifying that it is illegal to receive “anything of value” from
foreign nationals in connection with a U.S. election).
364
Danny Yadron, Russian Government Hackers Steal DNC Files on Donald Trump, THE
GUARDIAN (Jun. 14, 2016, 14:41 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2016/jun/14/russian-dnc-hack-donald-trump-files-us-election
[https://perma.cc/2V5G86QX].
365
See, e.g., Katelyn Burns, Trump Campaign Groups Spent $1.7 Million at His Own
Properties and Businesses Last Quarter, VOX (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2020/2/3/21120187/trump-fec-campaign-trump-organization [https://perma.cc/
DBD3-CG2M] (“President Donald Trump once bragged that if he ever ran for president,
he’d be the first person to make money off it. According to his campaign’s filings with the
Federal Election Commission, that prediction appears to be coming true.”). In total, the
President’s campaign appears to have spent $194,247.57 on Trump businesses, while
conservative leaning groups have spent an additional $1.7 million at them. See id.
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rentals at Trump hotels, restaurants, and other businesses.366 While such
payments may not be violations of FECA per se, they are if the payments
were above “fair market rate” for the goods or services rendered.367 An FEC
investigation is needed to resolve that question of fact.
Following the election, the nation was shocked by one of the most
brazen examples of political intimidation in the nation’s history when
President Trump pressured Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensberger
and Governor Brian Kemp to overturn the results of the Georgia presidential
election.368 The incident came to a head when Raffensberger’s legal team
leaked audio of a phone call in which Trump directly suggested
Raffensberger “find” votes in his favor so as to overturn the election’s
results.369 The incident is being investigated at a state level by the Fulton
County District Attorney.370 House Democrats urged FBI Director
Christopher Wray to look into the incident to determine whether federal law
was broken, but the Bureau has not yet announced any action.371
G. National Emergencies Under Trump
President Trump’s expansive view of executive power proved
especially dangerous in the time of a global pandemic because of the unclear
limits of the powers he is permitted to seize under the National Emergencies
Act. On March 13, 2020, President Trump utilized the processes in the
National Emergencies Act to declare a national emergency in response to the
explosive spread of SARS-CoV-2 (“coronavirus”).372 He was vague about
366
See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, CAMPAIGN FINANCE DATA: DISBURSEMENTS
https://www.fec.gov/data/disbursements/?data_type=processed&committee_id=C0058010
0&recipient_name=trump&two_year_transaction_period=2020&line_number=F3P-23
[perma.cc/3PTU-EZRS] (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) (noting inter alia several $37,541
payments to Trump Tower and $3,000 payments to Trump Restaurants for “rent,” plus
thousands more in travel lodging, facility rentals, and “legal & IT consulting”).
367
52 U.S.C. § 30114.
368
See Quint Forgey, Raffensberger: Trump Could Face Investigation Over Election Call,
POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/04/raffensperger-trumpinvestigation-call-454478 [perma.cc/H8M4-3C7L] (noting that legal experts and lawmakers
“have expressed alarm” over the phone call).
369
Id.
370
Id.
371
Id.
372
Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337–38 (Mar. 13, 2020) (“NOW, THEREFORE,
I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States, by the authority vested in me by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 201 and 301
of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) . . . do hereby find and proclaim
that the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States constitutes a national emergency . . . .”).
While the virus is often referred to in common parlance as “coronavirus” or “COVID-19,” it
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what authorities he intended to exercise in response to the pandemic—
specifying only that he would immediately waive or modify certain
requirements of the Medicare, Medicaid, and State Children’s Health
Insurance programs and of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act Privacy Rule.373
The emergency declaration was also issued in addition to a prior
emergency declaration related to illegal immigration from Latin America in
early 2019 so that he could gain control over sufficient funding to construct
a wall along the border of Mexico.374 The declaration occurred shortly after
a five-week shutdown of the federal government, spurred by Democrats’
refusal to approve a federal budget that included funding for the wall.375
Trump declared that, as part of his emergency powers, he would redirect
money appropriated for various Department of Defense construction projects
to the wall.376 Democrats were outraged and public watchdog groups sued.377
Ultimately, a federal judge ruled that while the declaration of the emergency
was valid, the redirection of funds for the wall was not, because Congress had
already expressly declined to issue the President funding for that specific
purpose.378 However, because only the redirection of funds, and not the
declaration of the emergency itself, was invalid, the emergency status
remained active.379 Trump extended the emergency twice,380 thus retaining
some emergency power381 which he used to redirect billions of dollars for
funding of increased counternarcotic activities along the border with
is actually a specific species of viruses that falls under the larger umbrella of “coronaviruses,”
and is not analogous to “COVID-19,” as that term refers to the respiratory infection that
develops in many individuals carrying the virus. See, e.g. Naming the Coronavirus Disease
(COVID-19) and the Virus That Causes It, WHO, https://www.who.int/emergencies/
diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it. [perma.cc/84L3-ZQGQ] (last visited Nov. 1,
2021).
373
Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337–38 (Mar. 13, 2020).
374
Niv Elis, Trump Extends Emergency Declaration at Border, THE HILL (Feb. 13, 2020),
https://thehill.com/policy/finance/483039-trump-extends-emergency-declaration-at-border
[perma.cc/V9JV-FRGN] (noting that for the wall, a prominent promise President Trump
made repeatedly throughout his campaign, was at the center of a political dispute that
culminated in the longest continuous shutdown of the federal government in American
history).
375
Id.
376
Id.
377
Id., Pete Williams, Judge Rules Trump Violated the Law on Wall Funding With National
Emergency, NBC NEWS (Oct. 11, 2019), www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/judgerules-trump-violated-law-wall-funding-national-emergency-n1065216 [perma.cc/4VS7R5HU].
378
Id.
379
Id.
380
Elis, supra note 374.
381
Williams, supra note 377.
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Mexico.382 This funding, unlike the wall funding, fell within the President’s
emergency powers because there is no express congressional prohibition
against the President using funds to fund counternarcotic activities, as there
was against funding the wall.383
In many ways, this standoff over funding for the wall echoed Nixon’s
standoff with Congress over water pollution funding. Even more egregious,
perhaps, was the fact that Trump’s actions followed a congressional override
of his veto. Thus, his actions not only seemed to run contrary to Congress’
express will, but also sought to undermine the very check the Constitution
imposes on the executive for this type of situation.
H. Failures to Comply with Freedom of Information Act
1. Persistent FOIA backlog
Finally, agencies under the Trump administration repeatedly failed to
comply with the Freedom of Information Act, and persistent inefficiencies in
the FOIA process exacerbated the difficulties bringing those agencies into
compliance. This was especially concerning because the Trump
Administration received an unprecedented number of FOIA requests.384
Republicans argued this was former employees of Hillary Clinton and Barack
Obama being paid by liberal groups to harass the Republican
administration.385 Opponents argued it was because of the Trump
administration’s unusual opacity. Regardless of the reason, the increase in
requests resulted in a significant backlog that has revealed significant
shortcomings in the FOIA process.386 This backlog reflects a selfperpetuating cycle of delay. Many agencies’ FOIA offices are unable to
timely respond to the increased volume of requests, and therefore those
382

Id.
Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S.Ct. 1 (2019) (“[T]he Government has made a sufficient
showing at this stage that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to obtain review of the Acting
Secretary’s compliance with Section 8005 . . . .”); see also, Andrew Arthur, Supreme Court
Allows Wall Construction to Proceed, CTR. IMMIGR. STUD. (Aug. 2, 2019),
https://cis.org/Arthur/Supreme-Court-Allows-Wall-Construction-Proceed [perma.cc/AN5PSCQD] (explaining that the Supreme Court found no possible violation of the Department
of Defense Appropriations Act for using counternarcotics funds to construct the border wall).
384
H.R. REP. NO. 116-09, at 3, 6–8 (2019).
385
Id.
386
See id. at 7 (statement of Rachel Spector, Acting Dep. Chief, FOIA Officer, U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior). A FOIA backlog has existed for years. However, under President Trump, the
backlog has increased drastically. See, e.g., Christine Mehta, Annual Report: FOIA Lawsuits
Reach Record Highs in FY 2018, THE FOIA PROJECT (Nov. 12, 2018), http://foiaproject.org
/2018/11/12/annual-report-foia-lawsuits-reach-record-highs-in-fy-2018/ [perma.cc/F8GP458V] (containing detailed data related to FOIA requests, ongoing FOIA related litigation,
and other metrics relevant to FOIA’s effectiveness).
383
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offices are faced with increased litigation in response to failure to comply
with FOIA. As processers are distracted by litigation, more FOIA requests
pile up in the backlog, and those too eventually result in litigation.
Federal agencies have led the effort to address this problem. For
example, EPA created new offices specifically dedicated to eliminating the
FOIA backlog.387 Some approaches, however, are transparent efforts to quash
public records requests. For example, in spring 2020, the FBI temporarily
stopped accepting electronic FOIA requests entirely, and announced it would
only respond to mailed requests.388 Since then, the agency has resumed
processing emailed FOIA requests, but the Information Management
Division’s FOIA submission website says the agency is still “unable to timely
process Freedom of Information/Privacy Act (FOIPA) requests received via
the eFOIPA portal or by standard mail.389 These approaches appear to run
directly counter to the goal of increasing government transparency. Thus,
further reforms to the FOIA process are needed to ensure agencies have the
resources at their disposal to process FOIA requests in a timely and
transparent manner.
2. FOIA as applied to Trump in a private capacity
An additional challenge presented by the Trump Administration in
this context related to President Trump’s status as a private business owner.
Even before Trump took office, there were widespread complaints that his
campaign was spending its money improperly at Trump held companies.
After Trump’s election, these allegations transferred from the Trump
campaign to the Trump government. For example, a Public Citizen FOIA

387
See H.R. REP. NO. 116-09, supra note 384, at 8 (statement of Tim Epp, Acting Dir., Nat’l
FOIA Off., U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency) (noting recent creation of EPA’s National FOIA Office
to centralize FOIA responses as part of broader strategic goal of increasing transparency,
including eliminating the FOIA backlog).
388
See Jeanmarie Evelly, Access to Public Information in the Age of COVID-19, CITY LIMITS
(March 26, 2021), https://citylimits.org/2021/03/26/access-to-public-information-in-theage-of-covid-19/ [perma.cc/3P55-HEBU] (“At the national level, certain agencies also
suspended or severely limited their processing of federal Freedom of Information Act or
FOIA requests, citing the ongoing emergency: the State Department, for instance, claimed it
was facing a 96 percent reduction in its ability to handle those requests while the FBI
dismantled its electronic FOIA portal for about three weeks, according to Gunita Singh, a
legal fellow with the Reporters Committee.”).
389
FBI Records: Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, https://efoia.fbi.gov/#home [perma.cc/2HVN-LW64] (last visited Nov. 6,
2021).
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request revealed that the Secret Service spent thousands of dollars at Trump
businesses.390
This problem is especially concerning because of a simple reality:
FOIA does not apply to private entities, even if they are owned by the
President.391 Therefore, Trump’s businesses do not have to reveal any
information when government officials or agencies use their services. The
only oversight that can be exercised through FOIA comes in the form of
FOIA requests to specific agencies. The Public Citizen FOIA request against
the Secret Service is a useful example for understanding how this approach
works. A journalist or watchdog group must FOIA the agency regarding
money spent on Trump businesses.392 They must then wait, often years (in
the case of Public Citizen, it was over three years),393 for the agency to
provide the information. This information relates only to that specific agency
and may be incomplete. For example, the Secret Service initially provided
Public Citizen with an eight-page report before an appellate body within the
agency eventually ordered production of thousands more pages of
documents.394
3. Important recent FOIA revelations
Despite these challenges, FOIA has still proven an effective tool for
government oversight. For example, in 2018, FOIA enabled reporters for a
number of media outlets to steadily uncover a series of abuses and
misallocations of funds by former-EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt.395 In fact,
Kevin Chmielewski, the EPA official who blew the whistle on Pruitt initially,

390

Patrick Llewelyn, How We Used FOIA to Hold Trump’s Secret Service Accountable, PUB.
CITIZEN (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.citizen.org/news/secretservicefoia/ [perma.cc/U6VVZH7M].
391
See e.g., What Information Is Not Available Under the FOIA?, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/foia/faqs/what-information-is-not-available-under-the-foia/
index.html [perma.cc/X8TD-YAFU] (last updated Sept. 17, 2015) (“The FOIA does not
require a state or local government or a private organization or business to release any records
directly to the public, whether such records have been submitted to the federal government
or not. However, records submitted to the federal government by such organizations or
companies may be available through a FOIA request if they are not protected by a FOIA
exemption, such as the one covering trade secrets and confidential business information.”).
392
Llewellyn, supra note 390.
393
Id.
394
Id.
395
Jake Lucas, How Times Reporters Use the Freedom of Information Act, N.Y. TIMES (July
21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/21/insider/information-freedom-reporterspruitt.html [perma.cc/FD88-STMG].
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credits FOIA as the main reason Pruitt was ultimately forced out.396
Chmielewski analogized his tips to journalists to leaving a trail of
“breadcrumbs,” which journalists could follow by filing FOIA requests.397
Ultimately, Pruitt was forced out after documents uncovered through a FOIA
request revealed he had misspent government funds, including $1560 on
fountain pens, and abused his office for personal gain, such as by seeking out
a Chick-Fil-A franchise for his wife.398
Additionally, in late 2020, a series of FOIA requests were filed by the
NAACP, ACLU, and others in response to revelations of controversial
actions taken by the Department of Homeland Security during a summer of
protests for racial justice in the wake of the high-profile killings of George
Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and others.399 These FOIA requests could prove
crucial to obtaining information from the agency, which has grown
increasingly defiant in its responses to public and Congressional oversight.400
In light of a series of other disturbing scandals that consumed the agency in
the second-half of 2020, FOIA will be a tool moving forward to shed light on
what exactly happened in the Office of Information and Analysis and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement under former Acting Secretary Chad
Wolfe’s leadership.401
396

Miranda Green, Ex-Aide Says He’ll Take Credit for Pruitt’s Downfall, THE HILL (July 8,
2018), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/396000-ex-aide-says-hell-take-creditfor-pruitts-downfall [perma.cc/SJ4E-MNWE].
397
Id.
398
ELP FOIA Work Plays Crucial Role in Pruitt Resignation, SIERRA CLUB (July 5, 2018),
https://www.sierraclub.org/environmental-law/elp-foia-work-plays-crucial-role-pruitt-resig
nation [perma.cc/48PB-L6P3].
399
See e.g. LDF Files FOIA Requests Regarding the Activity of Federal Agents in Portland,
Oregon, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & ED. FUND (July 17, 2020), https://www.naacpldf.org/pressrelease/ldf-files-foia-requests-regarding-the-activity-of-federal-agents-in-portland-oregon/
[perma.cc/4NKJ-GYQT]; Jay Stanley & Nicola Morrow, ACLU Seeks Information on
Government’s Aerial Surveillance of Protestors, ACLU (Aug. 4, 2020),
https://www.aclu.org/news/national-security/aclu-seeks-information-on-governmentsaerial-surveillance-of-protesters/ [perma.cc/3RY5-PJPK].
400
See Jackson Garrity, Homeland Security’s Defiance Presents Vexing Challenge for
Congressional Oversight, OVERSIGHT PROJECT (Oct. 1, 2020), https://oversightproject.org/
2020/10/01/homeland-securitys-defiance-presents-vexing-challenge-for-congressionaloversight/ [perma.cc/6VRE-92J5] (noting DHS’ refusal to provide information requested by
Congress during investigation of DHS scandals, and the Acting Secretary’s defiance of a
congressional subpoena).
401
In the second half of 2020, a series of disturbing allegations emerged regarding numerous
DHS sub-agencies. This included allegations that the Office of Information and Analysis had
conducted warrantless surveillance of peaceful protestors at Black Lives Matter protests in
Portland, Oregon. Id. At the same time those allegations were coming to light, the Office
was embroiled in a separate scandal involving allegations that a political appointee had
specifically instructed staff to ignore intelligence suggesting Russian actors were seeking to
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Prior to the Trump administration, FOIA also led to multiple
important revelations. New York Times reporters uncovered information
related to the Obama administration’s targeted killing of an American citizen
without a trial, and uncovered the administration’s internal legal analyses
related to the lawfulness of Guantanamo Bay detention center.402 FOIA also
allowed reporters to hold Bush administration Federal Emergency
Management Act (FEMA) officials accountable for the slow response to
Hurricane Katrina.403 The information contained in documents released by
FEMA showed how aid money was spent and how logistics were
coordinated.404
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
A. Priorities for a Post-Trump Congress
Close to half of voters supported Donald Trump in November 2020,
and millions still falsely believe that President-elect Joe Biden secured the
presidency through voter fraud.405 Another large section of the country took
to the streets despite a global pandemic to mark Biden’s win.406 This schism
undermines the integrity of the federal system of separated powers itself. The
American public cannot rely on hope alone that a president will not misuse
their power. For an accountable Executive branch to survive, additional
legislative reform is needed.407
interfere with the 2020 presidential election. Id. Parallel to those scandals was a
whistleblower report alleging doctors were performing “mass hysterectomies” on nonconsenting women held in Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention facilities. Laura
Bonomini, ICE Detention Whistleblower Highlights the Critical Role of Whistleblowers in
Virtual Oversight, OVERSIGHT PROJECT (Sept. 28, 2020), https://oversightproject.org/
2020/09/28/ice-detention-whistleblower-highlights-the-critical-role-of-whistleblowers-invirtual-oversight/ [perma.cc/EW7Q-QYWL].
402
Lucas, supra note 395.
403
Timothy J. Connor, FEMA, Newspapers in the Eye of the Storm, HOLLAND & KNIGHT
(June 2006), https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2006/06/fema-newspapersin-the-eye-of-the-storm-in-foia-ba [perma.cc/5MNA-6856].
404
Id.
405
See Ella Lee, Fact Check: Joe Biden Legally Won Election, Despite Persistent Contrary
Claims, USA TODAY (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/
2020/12/15/fact-check-joe-biden-legally-won-presidential-election/6537586002/
[https://perma.cc/6VJN-VXKU].
406
Minyvonne Burke & Natalia Abrahams, Biden’s Win Sparks Street Celebrations Around
the Country, NBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020election/biden-s-win-sparks-street-celebrations-around-country-n1246922 [https://perma.
Cc/VXZ4-ZLLU].
407
Kimberly Wehle, The Flaw in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, THE BULWARK
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This Part sketches out—very broadly—some areas that warrant
immediate possible reform in Congress. The details of optimal legislation
under each topic are well beyond the scope of this paper.
1. Strengthen Inspector General independence
When the IGA was signed into law, President Jimmy Carter stated an
IG must “always remember that their ultimate responsibility is not to any
individual but to the public interest.”408 Yet ironically, Presidents can divert
the IG’s responsibility from the public interest to themselves as individuals
because federal law permits them to remove IGs at-will.409 Although the
current laws make it difficult for IGs to carry out their duties without the fear
of being ousted for not seeing eye to eye with the president, legislative reform
should allow for greater IG independence in conjunction with the President’s
power to appoint.410
For example, Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut introduced the
Inspectors General Independence Act to enable IGs to serve seven-year terms
that can be renewed. Under the bill, if a president wishes to remove an IG, it
can only be for cause.411 The rationale to extend for-cause removal
protections to IGs lies in the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. Olson,
which found that the President’s control of the independent counsel “is [not]
‘so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require’ that they
be removable at will.”412 This would protect IGs from politically motivated
firings and increase the likelihood that an IG’s actions are independent and
not affected by the threat of termination.413
(Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.thebulwark.com/the-flaw-in-the-twenty-fifth-amendment/
[perma.cc/JSX6-UP2L] (“This is really where the Constitution has broken down. The
Constitution is not self-executing. It is a piece of paper. It is only so good as it is enforced
and respected.”).
408
OIG History, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.oig.dot.gov/
about-oig/oig-history [perma.cc/B6QF-GFRH] (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).
409
Saikrishna Prakash, Trump Has Declared War on Inspectors General. The System Can
Still Be Saved., WASH. POST (May 22, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
inspectors-general-independence-constitution-executive/2020/05/22/bb6be092-9b79-11eaac72-3841fcc9b35f_story.html [perma.cc/D9ZY-9CJF] (“Federal law allows presidents to
remove most inspectors general at will.”).
410
See id. (suggesting “for cause” protections for IGs, or vesting power-to-fire only in the
chief IG rather than the President, as a way to insulate IGs from pressure).
411
Murphy, Cooper Announce Legislation to Safeguard Inspectors General From
Politically-Motivated Firings, CHRIS MURPHY SENATE WEBSITE (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/murphy-cooper-announcelegislation-to-safeguard-inspectors-general-from-politically-motivated-firings
[perma.cc/MEG2-H4HX].
412
Prakash, supra note 409.
413
Murphy, supra note 411.
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Regarding vacant IG positions, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act can
be updated to require that “only the deputy IG, a senior official from the IG
office or a senior officer within the broader IG community” can serve as
acting IGs until the position is filled.414 This change would minimize the
extent to which a president could replace IGs with their political allies by
instead requiring them to choose from individuals already in the IG’s office.
Combined with the seven-year term reform, such a mechanism would enable
IGs to have more independent control of their offices and foster better
communication between different departments and agencies given the
potential pool of candidates for filling potential vacancies.
Alternatively, Congress could create an entirely new role of Chief IG,
who would be appointed by the President and removable at-will with
delegated power to appoint and remove agency IGs for cause.415 Thus, the
IGs beneath the Chief IG would be viewed as more independent—much like
the special counsel under DOJ regulations—and presidents would be more
likely to face political scrutiny for firing a Chief IG for failing to execute a
removal order.416
Relatedly, Congress should consider passing the Merit System
Protection Board Empowerment Act of 2020.417 This Act would reauthorize
the Merit System Protection Board, which has been unable to investigate
whistleblower complaints under its jurisdiction for over a year,418 and would
grant the Board authority to proactively survey federal employees to ensure
agencies are complying with federal whistleblower protection laws.419

414

Troy Cribb, Five Ways Congress Can Strengthen the Independence of Inspectors General,
P’SHIP FOR PUB. SERV. (July 1, 2021), https://ourpublicservice.org/blog/five-ways-congresscan-strengthen-the-independence-of-inspectors-general/ [perma.cc/UM54-HC4T].
415
Prakash, supra note 409.
416
Id.
417
H.R. 7864, 116 Cong. (2020); see also Press Release, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform,
Connolly, Maloney Introduce the Merit System Protection Board Empowerment Act of 2020
(July 30, 2020) [hereinafter House Oversight Committee Press Release], https://oversight.
house.gov/news/press-releases/connolly-maloney-introduce-the-merit-systems-protectionboard-empowerment-act-of [perma.cc/DU5H-7THB].
418
House Oversight Committee Press Release, supra note. 417; see also Ana Popovich, U.S.
Merit System Protection Board Plagued by Structural Defects, WHISTLEBLOWER NEWS
NETWORK (July 10, 2020), https://whistleblowersblog.org/2020/07/articles/governmentwhistleblowers/u-s-merit-system-protection-board-plagued-by-structural-defects/
(discussing how under the Trump administration, the MSPB was essentially rendered useless
because it lacked Senate confirmed members, and relatedly federal whistleblower complaints
sat in unadjudicated limbo).
419
House Oversight Committee Press Release, supra note 417.
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2. Streamline FOIA
The Supreme Court teed up a potential necessary change to the FOIA
in U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club, in which environmentalists
challenged the failure by the Fish & Wildlife Service and the National Marine
Fisheries Service [together, the “Services”] to produce a “draft” biological
opinion requested by the environmentalists under FOIA.420 The draft was
produced by agency officials as part of a rulemaking by the EPA to assess the
impact the rule would have on a species protected under the Endangered
Species Act.421 Because the drafts were not the final position taken by the
Service with respect to the rule, and because the EPA had not yet finalized
the rule itself, the Service cited FOIA’s deliberative process exemption as
precluding the drafts from public reach through FOIA.422The ACLU and
CREW filed a joint amicus brief with the Court arguing the case “presents an
important opportunity for the Supreme Court to affirm the American public’s
right of access to documents outlining government procedures under FOIA
and limit the scope for which the government can . . . keep documents
secret.”423 As these groups argued in their brief, the question turned on
whether the Court views the exemptions within FOIA as identifying narrow
categories of documents protected only when necessary to enhance agency
decision making, or whether these exemptions enable broad confidentiality
from the public.424
In her first opinion on the Supreme Court, Justice Amy Coney Barrett
wrote for the majority that the draft was exempt from FOIA, thereby
increasing the scope of the deliberative process exemption to FOIA. Under
50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(5), the Services must share final drafts with the action
agency (here, EPA) before declaring the draft “finalized.”425 Yet, Barrett held
that the draft biological opinion did not need to be shared under that
regulation. This is problematic because, if a draft document influences EPA’s
thinking on the subject so as to result in the agency amending its proposed
420

141 S. Ct. 777, 783–84 (2021).
Id.
422
Id.
423
U..S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club, ACLU (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.aclu.
org/cases/us-fish-and-wildlife-service-v-sierra-club [perma.cc/ZKD4-MX83].
424 See Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv. v. Sierra Club, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 777 (2021) (No. 19-574), https://www.aclu.org/legaldocument/us-v-sierra-club-brief-amici-curiae-aclu-et-al [perma.cc/C3RP-D8AM] (arguing
the purpose of the deliberative process privilege is a narrow exception to the broad
presumption that FOIA creates a right for the public to access government records, and that
whether it applies should turn on whether the administrative context in which it was created
is one which is enhanced when agency official’s discussions are shielded from the public
eye).
425
Sierra Club, 141 S. Ct. at 785.
421
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rule, the draft has the practical effect of being final within the Services. In
this way, Barrett’s opinion creates a loophole, because an agency can change
its rule based on a draft without ever declaring the draft to be final, thus
exempting the draft from FOIA despite its tangible effect on the outcome of
the rulemaking process.
The majority asserted that the draft did not have “real operative
effect” because it did not change the “legal regime to which agency action is
subject.”426 However, as the dissenting justices point out, the majority’s
reasoning applies the deliberative process privilege in a way that allows the
action agency to choose whether a document is labeled as “final” or a “draft,”
and thus alter whether it is subject to FOIA.427 The majority opinion does not
draw a clear limit on the discretion of the action agency to decide whether a
document is final or not.428
In light of this broad holding, Congress should step in and clarify that
where a draft has “real operative effect,” it is no longer protected under the
deliberative process exemption. Congress should also make clear that a “real
operative effect” is one which results in substantive changes to the action
agency’s proposed course of action.429
There remains the larger problem of the persistent FOIA backlog, as
well. Of course, the FOIA backlog was not new to the Trump administration,
but the sheer volume and nature of the scandals that the administration
generated heightened the need to address the problem. The GAO and DOJ’s
Office of Information Policy have proposed new regulations to expedite the
process by encouraging greater proactive disclosure of information by
agencies.430 However, it remains unclear whether those regulatory changes
will adequately address the problem. Congress should work with GAO and
DOJ to develop a legislative approach to streamline the process and
maximize the effectiveness of FOIA’s presumption by favoring disclosure.

426

Id. at 786–87 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 789 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
428
Id. at 786.
429
See id. at 789–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
430
GAO, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: FEDERAL AGENCIES’ RECENT IMPLEMENTATION
EFFORTS 1, 3, 12 (2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/705284.pdf [perma.cc/353SLGFP] (outlining GAO and OIP’s recommended changes to FOIA implementing regulations
in agencies across the federal administrative state). The FOIA’s proactive disclosure
provisions are intended to ensure that the public has ready access to certain key information
about their government without the need to make a FOIA request. Proactive Disclosure of
Non-Exempt Agency Information: Making Information Available Without the Need to File a
FOIA Request, DEP’T JUST., (last updated July 26, 2021) https://www.justice.gov/oip/oipguidance/proactive_disclosure_of_non-exempt_information.
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3. Improve FISA compliance
The PATRIOT Act lowered the standard for collecting foreign
intelligence information as a “primary” purpose to a “significant” purpose of
the investigation.431 Although the burden of proof standard has lowered, the
meaning of “significant” is still undefined.432 This lack of clarity has allowed
federal agencies like the NSA to conduct upstream surveillance on all
international communications made by Americans.433 There was previously
litigation filed by the ACLU and other First Amendment non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) regarding this matter, in which the NGOs claimed civil
litigants must be able to challenge FISA surveillance because “it is critical
that those directly affected by mass foreign intelligence surveillance be able
to obtain judicial review.”434 Those claims were ultimately struck down by
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.435 The
Fourth Circuit upheld that dismissal in September 2021.436
The USA Freedom Reauthorization Act would limit the FBI’s ability
to seek FISA surveillance orders, precluding their collection on an “ongoing
basis,” for example, as well as “cellular or GPS location information,” and
applicants must certify that DOJ is aware of “any information that might raise
doubts about the application.”437 The bill would also limit retention of FISA
information to five years, increase criminal penalties for violations, and
impose strict internal compliance and auditing mechanisms so that courts can
declassify and publicly release FISA documents.438

431
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR.,
https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/fisa/ [perma.cc/6QTY-RVN5] (last visited Sept. 28,
2021).
432
Id.
433
Wikimedia v. NSA—Challenge to Upstream Surveillance Under the FISA Amendments
Act, ACLU (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/cases/wikimedia-v-nsa-challenge-up
stream-surveillance-under-fisa-amendments-act [perma.cc/KMB4-VRU4].
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ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., supra note 431.
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Lawsuit: Wikimedia Foundation v. NSA, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST. AT COLUM.
UNIV., https://knightcolumbia.org/cases/wikimedia--v-nsa. [perma.cc/9KEM-CJLS] (last
visited Aug. 24, 2021).
436
See Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 14 F.4th 276 (4th Cir. 2021).
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H.R. 6172, 116th Cong. (2020).
438
Id. §104(a)(3) (limiting retention time); id. § 205(b) (increasing penalties); id. §605
(establishing compliance mechanisms).

Vol. 7:1]

Executive Accountability Legislation

103

4. Strengthen special prosecutor independence
In the wake of the Mueller investigation, Congress needs to
articulate—once again—the boundaries of executive branch investigations of
sitting presidents.439 The existing ban on prosecting presidents is contained
in two Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memoranda, which are not laws, and
have not gone through the advocacy process that would produce a controlling
judicial opinion.440
The current guidelines, issued in 1973 and 2000 by OLC,441 were
nonetheless binding on Mueller because the special counsel—an agent of
DOJ—produced what amounted to an ambiguous report that obscured
Trump’s legal violations, including possible obstruction of justice.442
Because the guidelines were issued by an executive agency and without even
the benefit of notice-and-comment procedures, they do not reflect the will of
Congress, and in fact appear to undermine constitutional safeguards on the
executive branch.443 Therefore, Congress should pass a statute overriding
them, as it did post-Watergate, and specify the circumstances under which
presidents can be indicted and the tolling of statutes of limitations to enable
prosecutions after a president leaves office.444
5. Reform FACA
Although federal advisory boards and committees enjoy a great deal
of autonomy under FACA, they remain subject to judicial review.445 In a
2020 case, the EPA argued that it was justified in forbidding those who

439

Jennifer Rubin, Four Big Constitutional Fixes We Need, Thanks to Trump, WASH. POST
(Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/26/four-big-constit
utional-fixes-we-need-thanks-trump/ [perma.cc/9NPD-M6LG].
440
See, e.g., Kimberly Wehle, “Law and” The OLC’s Article II Immunity Memos, 32 STAN.
L. POL’Y. REV. 1, 41–47 (explaining OLC memos may either be considered categorical
exercises of prosecutorial discretion on the part of DOJ not to prosecute a sitting president
or constitute non-legislative administrative rules).
441
Id. at 21–23.
442
Rubin, supra note 439; Wehle, supra note 440 at 5–6.
443
See Wehle, supra note 440, at 41–45 (explaining the proper sources of law under our
constitutional framework are congressional lawmaking, judicial interpretation of the laws,
and the power of states to institute their own laws).
444
See id. at 47–54 (arguing Congress should solve the constitutional ambiguity and reform
prosecutorial procedures for sitting presidents).
445
Seth Jaffe, EPA’s Limits on Advisory Committee Participation Are Subject to Judicial
Review, FOLEY HOAG (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.lawandenvironment.com/2020/03/27/
epas-limits-on-advisory-committee-participation-are-subject-to-judicial-review/
[perma.cc/J3MB-F5TU].
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received EPA grants from serving on the EPA advisory committee.446 The
First Circuit explained that although FACA was enacted to avoid undue
influence by the regulated community on federal advisory committees, the
EPA’s advisory committees must be balanced sufficiently to be able to
provide independent advice and to “clearly [require] agency heads at least to
consider whether new restraints on committee membership might
inappropriately enhance special interest influence and to eschew such
restraints when they do so.”447 Congress should revisit FACA in light of
modern developments in technology and political realities to ensure that
decision-makers are not unduly influenced by certain interests without public
scrutiny.
6. Amend the FEC
Because President Trump left the FEC without a quorum, the agency
was powerless to investigate campaign finance law violations during his
administration.448 Congress must amend FECA to create a mechanism to
ensure empty Commission seats are immediately filled to facilitate a quorum,
particularly in an election year. Otherwise, the country is vulnerable to the
corrupting influence of improper contributions in politics. In addition to
continued threats of foreign election interference, there remains the
possibility that incidents similar to the ITT affair could occur again.
B. Additional Legislative Needs
The years following Nixon’s Watergate scandal ushered in multiple
measures to hold the Executive accountable and prevent misconduct, but
those measures are not used to their full potential. Agencies are mainly under
the control of the Executive, and vague laws in their current state are just
words scrawled on paper with no real bite. That has thrown off the scale of
equivalent separated powers, leaving an imbalanced system that favors the
Executive. Lack of transparency and accountability is not something uniquely
tied to the Trump administration. Still, it ran rampant under Trump. This is
why, similar to post-Watergate, another era of legislative reform is needed to

446
See Union of Concerned Scientists v., Wheeler, 954 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing
the appearance or reality of potential interference with board members’ ability to serve
independently and objectively).
447
Id. at 19; Jaffe, supra note 445; Union of Concerned Scientists, Big Win! Court Questions
EPA Limits on Science Advisory Committees, ECOWATCH (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.ecowatch.com/epa-science-advisory-limits-win-2645574831.html?rebelltitem
=2#rebelltitem2 [perma.cc/TT7U-QXHN] (citation omitted).
448
Levinthal, supra note 357.
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ensure that in the future, mistrust in the executive branch does not reach the
levels that we see today.
The foregoing discussion focused on amendments to pre-existing
legislation that was passed to address the abuses of Watergate. Congress
needs to do even more, as the abuses of the Trump administration stretched
beyond what even Richard Nixon attempted.
1. Legislatively implement the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
When it was first incorporated into the Constitution, the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment was designed to serve two purposes—to clarify the line of
succession in the event the president dies, resigns, or is disabled; and to
clarify how the role of vice president is to be filled if it ever becomes
vacant.449 Some scholars have argued the amendment could be used as a
“mutiny provision,” allowing the presidential Cabinet to rein in a president
who is unwilling to discharge his duties for reasons other than physical
disability.450 Experts have warned that the amendment as written is
insufficient to check a president where doing so is necessary and Congress is
otherwise unwilling to act.451
President Trump tested positive for COVID-19 and was hospitalized
amid a global pandemic.452 Given his age at the time of infection and the
election of Biden, who is also well into his senior citizen years, it would have
been beneficial to have a plan in place to transition quickly had his health
declined rapidly. Furthermore, legitimate discussions of invoking the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment arose in the aftermath of the January 6, 2021
insurrection at the U.S. Capitol Building, which was widely blamed on

449

See Kimberly Wehle, Nice Idea, But 25th Amendment is No Fix for a Dysfunctional
President, THE HILL (Sept. 11, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/405952-niceidea-but-25th-amendment-is-no-fix-for-a-dysfunctional-presidency [perma.cc/7TDWGLVN)] [hereinafter Wehle, Nice Idea].
450
Id.
451
Id. (“[A]t the end of the day, impeachment remains the best bet for addressing fatal
problems with an incumbent presidency. And if Congress is unwilling to take that step, it’s
not likely to pull the Section 4 trigger, either. Ultimately, therefore, it’s up to voters to keep
a close eye on things by exercising their prerogative to hire and fire at the ballot booth.”).
452
Christine Wang & Mike Calia, President Trump, First Lady Melania Test Positive for
Coronavirus, CNBC (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/02/president-donaldtrump-says-he-has-tested-positive-for-coronavirus.html [perma.cc/C27L-U8SA].
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Trump.453 But if a vice president is unwilling to activate Section Four of the
Amendment or obtain the requisite number of cabinet members, power may
not be transferred from a president.454
The holes in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment reflect a broader theme
underlying many issues discussed throughout this paper—that the “the
Constitution mostly runs on the honor system.”455 The Trump administration
demonstrated that, where a President does not act in good faith to execute and
obey the laws of the United States, there must be consequences with teeth.
Writer Jennifer Rubin has thus argued Congress should pass legislation
requiring presidents, in writing, to designate mechanisms for transferring
powers if they become disabled.456 To assess mental and physical fitness, a
president may be required to have a yearly physical examination and submit
the report by waiving doctor-patient privilege.457 A president may specify the
circumstances under which such transfer of power would be activated.458 This
may be constitutionally tricky, but given the advanced age of our recently
elected presidents and unexpected circumstances like the global pandemic
crisis, it would be wise for Congress to consider legislation implementing the
25th Amendment with more specificity and transparency.459 Such a change
would strip the President of unchecked discretion to determine whether they
are unable to discharge the duties of the office.460
2. Pass the For the People Act
Congress has already introduced legislation known as “For the People
Act” in both the House (H.R. 1)461 and Senate (S.1),462 which would stave off
the confusion and misinformation that culminated in January 6 with national
automatic voter registration,463 provide an answer to partisan

453
See, e.g., John Hudak, Invoke the 25th Amendment to Save the Country From Donald
Trump, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/
2021/01/07/invoke-the-25th-amendment-to-save-the-country-from-donald-trump/
[perma.cc/W6P3-55PL].
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Id.
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See Wehle, Nice Idea, supra note 449 (“Of course, the notion that an ailing Donald Trump
would step aside from his position as the most powerful man in the world for the good of the
country is sheer folly. It would never happen.”).
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Rubin, supra note 439.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Wehle, Nice Idea, supra note 449.
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H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021).
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S. 949, 116th Cong. (2019).
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Id. at Div. A, Tit. I, Sub. A, Pt. 1, Pt. 2.
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gerrymandering,464 reform campaign finance laws,465 and revise federal
ethics rules.466 The John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act (S. 4263)
would also restore a key portion of the Voting Rights Act that was gutted by
the Supreme Court in 2013.467 (The full range of potential federal changes to
voting and election laws—and the need for a constitutional amendment
enshrining an affirmative right to vote for citizens, although vital, are outside
the scope of this article.)
3. Amend the Electoral Count Act of 1887
Importantly, Congress must immediately revisit the Electoral Count
Act of 1887, an arcane and ambiguous law that prompted much mischief in
2020—including a threat that State legislatures could ignore the popular vote
and legislate a slate of electors for Trump within a “safe harbor” deadline
under the statute.468 The act also sets forth the procedures governing
congressional objections to state certifications of Electoral College votes on
January 6.469 The law should be amended to foreclose abject political
objections made without factual or legal justification—like those promoting
the “Big Lie” that millions of Americans were duped into believing in
2020.470
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4. Pass impeachment procedure legislation
Donald Trump’s second impeachment trial—like his first—
highlighted some critical gaps in the Constitution which, despite mentioning
impeachment six times,471 left vague a number of questions that were left to
internal Senate maneuvering and politics. These included the question of
whether a president can be tried after leaving office so long as he is
impeached while still in office (the Senate answered this twice in the
affirmative on bipartisan votes, but Republicans voting for acquittal used it
as a guise for avoiding conviction of a member of their own party); 472
whether the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court should preside under those
circumstances (Chief Justice Roberts unilaterally bowed out, despite a lack
of a case or controversy presenting that question for resolution); 473 whether
ex parte communications between Senators and defense counsel are
permitted (this happened among Senators Ted Cruz and Lindsey Graham,

471

U.S. CONST. Art. 1 § 2 (“The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and
other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.”); id. Art. 1 § 3 (“The Senate
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still in office, explaining “first, the case of Sen. William Blount, who in 1797-1798 was
impeached by the House, expelled from the Senate, and then tried by the Senate, in that order,
and, second, the case Secretary of War William Belknap, who in 1876 was both impeached
and tried after he left office. But those cases hardly buttress Bobbitt’s position.”).
473
Amy Howe, Roberts Will Not Preside Over Impeachment Trial, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 25,
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with no accountability or serious pushback);474 and the circumstances under
which calling witnesses is appropriate—i.e., if there remains a question of
fact salient to the underlying legal charge.475 On that final point,
implementation of some form of rules of evidence would ensure that the trial
does not become a “political circus” that weakens the integrity of the system.
5. Mandate compliance with the Advice and Consent Clause
Infamously, Donald Trump used the power to designate “acting”
officials in lieu of putting his picks for Cabinet-level and other posts requiring
Senate confirmation under the scrutiny of the Constitution’s Advice and
Consent Clause.476 He also installed his personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, as
a de facto diplomat and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, as the head of an
assortment of executive functions, including the COVID-19 relief response
task force.477 Congress must pass legislation establishing an alternative
procedure for filling open posts that cannot function as an end run around its
advice and consent prerogative, thereby precluding presidents from
outsourcing the functions of the office to personal loyalists who are not even
government employees. To be sure, the details of such legislation are not selfevident, but the necessity for it is.
6. Implement the Emoluments Clauses
The Framers of the Constitution were crystal clear about one thing:
the presidency was not to be a personal money-making machine. To that end,
Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the Constitution prohibits presidents from
474
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receiving gifts from foreign states and monarchies.478 Article II, Section 1,
Paragraph 7 prohibits the president from receiving any “Emolument” from
the federal government or the states beyond “a Compensation” for his
“Services” as chief executive.479 Unlike prior presidents, Trump refused to
divest his private assets upon ascending to the presidency and made money
off of his properties through the use of Secret Service details and the
conducting of business.480
Congress needs to implement presidential divestiture and disclosure
laws and legislate a cause of action for Emoluments Clause violations to
ensure accountability for non-compliance through the courts.481 For starters,
it should pass a statute requiring liquidation of a president’s business holdings
through a blind trust agreement once they enter the office.482 This would
eliminate ethical problems from arising as a result of a president’s
holdings.483 To address a president’s conduct in office, there needs to be a
clear statutory definition of “emoluments” to prohibit a president from
accepting gifts (and defining that term) unless Congress approves explicitly.
Also, if a president violates this ban, a remedy of forfeiture should be
established.484
7. Impose consequences for illegally impounded funds
As shown under both Nixon and Trump, Congress must impose
tangible consequences for agencies when funds are impounded for political
reasons. These could include administrative disciplinary measures modeled
on the reporting requirement and non-criminal penalties for violations of the
Antideficiency Act. 485 The Congressional Power of the Purse Act, a bill
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proposed in June 2020 by Senator Patrick Leahy,486 includes penalty
provisions aimed at deterring future executive officials from supporting
rogue presidents who use public funding to further their own political aims.487
8. Reform the National Emergencies Act
In 2019, Senator Mike Lee introduced the Article One Act to place
greater constraints on the ability of a president to declare national
emergencies.488 Under the Article One Act, national emergencies would
automatically expire after thirty days unless expressly approved by
Congress.489 The emergencies would also have to be renewed every year or
otherwise expire.490 However, the Act has not been passed in the time since
its introduction.
In 2020, former Representative Justin Amash likewise introduced the
National Emergencies Reform Act.491 This Act involved even stricter
constraints than proposed in the Article One Act. It would give Congress only
two days to decide whether to authorize a presidential declaration of
emergency, and if Congress failed to act in that timeframe the declaration
would expire.492 Congress would also be required to renew the emergency
authorization every sixty days, rather than every year.493 Like the Article One
Act, the National Emergencies Reform Act did not move forward after its
introduction in the House Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings, and Emergency Management.
Either of these proposals would go a long way to ending the
languishing states of emergencies declared by presidents and reduce the
likelihood of future executives abusing the broad authority given to them
under the National Emergencies Act. Congress should identify which
timeframe properly balances the need to restrain executive authority and the
need for Congress to carefully deliberate whether to approve a particular
declaration, and then pass a law enacting these restraints.
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CONCLUSION
Watergate was a tipping point in American history in which the nation
was forced to confront corruption on a scale that had never been seen in the
federal government. In response, Congress passed reforms intended to ensure
that level of corruption could never be repeated. For decades, those reforms
were viewed as effective solutions, but all the while issues festered just
outside the public eye. This included a growing FOIA backlog, persecution
of whistleblowers and independent investigators, and other serious concerns.
Like Nixon’s Watergate, the Trump presidency may be another watershed
moment for federal oversight. The Trump administration laid bare the
weaknesses that remain in oversight laws. To seal the gaps left by the postWatergate reform laws, Congress must act by passing laws providing
independent investigators and public watchdog groups with the tools
necessary to protect our nation’s democracy.
These tools will take many forms. Oversight entities such as the FEC,
Office of Government Ethics, and FISA courts must be given greater
authorities. Independent officials, such as independent counsels and
inspectors general, must be given greater protections so they can pursue their
missions without interference. Likewise, the whistleblowers they rely upon
must also be protected, including through a renewed MSPB. And public
actors, such as the free press and oversight-oriented nonprofits, must be given
a re-tooled FOIA and FACA to ensure they have access to information of
importance to the public at-large.
Beyond shoring up post-Watergate reforms, Congress has spadework
to do around the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Emoluments Clauses, the
Advice and Consent Clause, the Impeachment Clauses, as well as voting
rights and the procedures for calculating Electoral College votes. By ensuring
investigative powers are widely held and effectively equipped among actors
inside and outside of the federal government, Congress can build greater
accountability into our constitutional system, and will help Americans rest
easy knowing that our democratic values are not vulnerable to theft by corrupt
officials working for their own political or personal ends.

